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Any good poet, in our age at least,
must begin with the scientific view
of the world; and any scientist worth
listening to must be something of a
poet, must possess the ability to
communicate to the rest of us his
sense of love and wonder at what his
work discoversEdward Abbey
The Journey Home
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INTRODUCTION

Certain viewpoints in psychology, primarily aligned with the
"philosophy of science," have come to be fairly commonly held as
assumptions concerning proper research practice, the aims of
research, and the ways in which research results fit into a more
general concern with "psychological knowledge."

These assumptions

center particularly around a professional concern with "objectivity"
in scientific practice and involve an insistence that objective
research involves, in some form or another, experimental research
design.

While Skinner and others have addressed these assumptions,

for the most part they have remained unarticulated.
The present project is concerned with examining these assump
tions from a radical behaviorist orientation.

Specifically,

Skinner's treatment of scientific knowledge and the effect of
research practices on the behavior of researchers will be examined.
The epistemological focus of this project involves looking at the
behavioral realities, within a context of controlling environmental
contingencies, which comprise professional research activity.

This

project also attempts to organize and clarify some of Skinner's
discussion relevant to epistemological issues in science.
The central concern with developing a radical behaviorist
epistemology will be seen to revolve around the importance of verbal
behavior, specifically the verbal behavior of scientists when
"making sense" of a phenomenon of interest.

While much scientific
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activity is not necessarily "verbal," it is in the area of verbal
behavior that epistemological issues generally arise.

In particular,

an orientation to verbal behavior as behavior which functions in
particular ways to alter the behavior of others, and which is
under the direct control of environmental contingencies, leads to
certain conclusions concerning epistemological issues which are
different than those commonly held within the traditional psycho
logical community.
Some aspects of the author's verbal behavior in writing this
thesis may be commented upon.

First, the author has been primarily

writing to members of the behaviorist verbal community.

Therefore,

a certain familiarity with a Skinnerian orientation has been
assumed in the reader.

Others with a different conceptual frame

work may therefore find the present paper difficult to understand.
Secondly, the author has made extensive use of quotations and
samples from other individuals' works.

These are presented as

samples of verbal behavior which have an integrity of their own and
which, hopefully, are helpful in shaping particular discriminations
in the reader.

Finally, the author has tried, as much as possible,

to emit verbal behavior which will be effective in engaging the
reader's current repertoire with respect to the issues discussed
herein.
This project is presented as a "conceptual analysis."

This is

to distinguish it from "experimental" or "research-oriented" theses
more commonly encountered within the profession.

While the project

is concerned with research as an important aspect of issues relevant
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to epistemology, no "data" are presented.

The project is somewhat

empirical, however, in attempting to get at the "facts" of profes
sional research practice.
The major purpose of the present project has been (1) to
clarify and articulate a radical behaviorist epistemology,

(2) to

show how epistemological issues engage the practice of research in
psychology, and (3) to demonstrate how research practice may be
looked at in a way which clarifies certain issues related to the
generation of psychological knowledge.
issues related to epistemology.

Chapter I introduces certain

Specifically, it attempts to

clarify what is meant by "scientific knowledge" and how research
procedures function to produce "scientific knowledge" in individuals.
It is here that many of Skinner's discussions relevant to the issue
will be encountered.

In Chapter II, an epistemological position

derived from a radical behaviorist viewpoint will be summarized.

Also, some major implications of this view are presented.

In

Chapter III, the author attempts to illustrate how epistemological
issues in psychology might be dealt with by looking at two particu
lar examples of research on verbal behavior.

In particular, the

research is presented to illustrate how epistemological and
conceptual issues may be approached by examining research behavior
in some detail.
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CHAPTER I
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE

In order to develop the radical behaviorist position with
respect to epistemology and the implications such a position has for
both psychological research methods and conceptions of scientific
knowledge, I wish to contrast radical behaviorism with "methodological
behaviorism."

I will first offer three characterizations of

methodological behaviorism.

I will then look at both methodological

behaviorism and radical behaviorism in the context of their respec
tive views of scientific knowledge and certain methodological
concepts and practices.
Kendler and Spence (1976) discuss methodological behaviorism
in the context of a critique of neobehaviorism's (as opposed to the
classical behaviorism of Watson; see Koch, 1964) epistemological
and methodological commitments.

They characterize methodological

behaviorism as follows:
Reference has already been made to the distinction between
metaphysical behaviorism and methodological behaviorism
(Bergmann, 1956), the former denying the existence of
mental states, the latter asserting that behavior rather
than mental states is the primary datum of psychology--The doctrine of methodological behaviorism, adopted by
neobehaviorism, demands that the dependent and inde
pendent variables, as well as the theoretical constructs,
be defined in terms of inter-subjectively agreed-upon
events.
(Kendler and Spence, 1976, p. 517)
Another picture of methodological behaviorism is given in
Murphy and Kovach's (1972) description of psychology as an emerging
science:
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Until a few decades ago, the ambition to make
psychology a science was considered to be possible only
in those aspects of psychology which, by their content,
were closest to physics. This was notable in studies
of thresholds in psychophysics, in psychophysiology, and
in those aspects of learning theory which were most
clearly mathematical. But this is no longer the case.
The severity of criteria for research design, the
elaborateness of controls, the care given to the null
hypothesis, the attempt to define how far a conclusion
may be generalized and where the generalization must
cease on the basis of a specific piece of research work—
all these apply to all psychology
From this view
point, it is not a portion of psychology that is
conceived to belong fully to science; all of psychology
is moving in the direction of standardizations of
concepts and methods to make itself a part of today's
general science.
(Murphy and Kovach, 1972, pp. 469-470)
The distinction to be made between radical and methodological
behaviorism is, by this time, not new.

Skinner made the distinction

as early as 1945 in his contribution to the Symposium on Operationism,
about which I will have more to say later.

For Skinner, the dis

tinction revolved around the issue of the admissibility of private
events as psychological data (Skinner, 1945, 1974).

Others,

notably Day (1975a, 1977), identify the distinction as involving
broader professional issues, which include the nature of science,
proper methods and values for research, and conceptions of how such
research can demonstrate and increase knowledge.

The following

quotation from Day is illustrative of his view:
First, with respect to methodological behaviorism,
it would be a mistake to restrict one's conception of
methodological behaviorism to the commitment to a
publicly-observable data-base alone. Most psychological
research that I know of, including radical behaviorist
research however characterized, involves in one way or
another the analysis of publicly-observable phenomena.
The trouble comes in getting hung-up about public
observability
£pjrofessional orthodoxy in
psychology involves an insistence that psychology study
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only publicly-observable behavior. This insistence,
as a kind of intraverbal fetish, betrays that a broader
set of professional beliefs and values lies at the
heart of methodological behaviorism. Methodological
behaviorism involves a widely accepted professional
orientation towards how one should conduct psychological
research in general. Verbalizations of this orientation
amount to a kind of crude philosophy of science.
(Day, 1977, p. 4)
What are these "professional beliefs and

values" associated

with methodological behaviorism? The reader may find a tenor of
these values in the quotation from Murphy and

Kovach, above.

It is

the purpose of this chapter to examine some concepts central to
methodological behaviorism, to offer some criticisms which bring
the tenets of methodological behaviorism into question, and to des
cribe how radical behaviorism provides an alternative and, in my
mind, important view.

I will do this by addressing myself to two

areas of concern which are conceptually interrelated in many ways,
but which, for the purposes of this paper, will be treated separately.
They are:

(1) the nature of scientific knowledge and (2) the nature

of experimental methodology.

The Nature of Scientific Knowledge
The notion of scientific knowledge that methodological behavior
ism has embraced is centered around the notion of "objectivity";
that is, to discover what methodological behaviorism admits as
knowledge it is necessary to look at what it means to be objective
in scientific practice.

The roots of this identification of know

ledge and objectivity lie very deep in Western thought, but they
were articulated and brought into the field of psychology in its

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

present form primarily through the acceptance of certain aspects of
logical positivism, notably operationism, in the 1930's (Boring, 1950).
For a more complete discussion of logical positivism and operationism
the reader is referred to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967)
entries under "logical positivism," "operationism," and the "history
of epistemology," to Boring (1950, pp. 653-658) and to Stevens
(1939).

I will summarize here only what I take to be the salient

aspects derived from logical positivism which cure generally
accepted by methodological behaviorists.
(1)

Logical positivism is a philosophical thesis which came

about as essentially a reaction to the problem of subjectivity in
science (Boring, 1950, p. 655).

Logical positivism came to influence

psychology in the form of operationism (Bridgeman, 1928; Stevens,
1939), which holds that the meaning of a concept can only be
determined by defining the concept in terms of concrete operations
used in its measurement and that concepts which cannot be so defined
are meaningless and out of the realm of science.
(2)

Basic data in psychology are therefore public, and con

clusions drawn from such data are subject to general agreement.
(3)

"Truth by agreement" (Skinner, 1945, p. 293) is that set

of verbal and research practices whereby, while absolute knowledge
of any phenomenon is unattainable, truth earn be defined as a "set
of empirical propositions agreed-upon by members of society"
(Stevens, 1939) and the criteria for truth or falisity are based
upon am observation-base that is publicly-verifiable.
(4)

Therefore, knowledge in psychology is necessarily
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objective; there is no room for subjectivism in science.
Ihherent in these assumptions is a conceptualization of know
ledge which Day (1977) has described as follows:
Basically what is involved are views to the effect that
scientific knowledge is different in nature from, and
intrinsically superior to, common sense knowledge.
It
is obtained by controlled experimental research, the
objectivity of which is assured by the use of profession
ally endorsed methods of experimental design. The
legitimacy of knowledge claims resulting from psycho
logical research is generally assessed by techniques
of statistical inference. The long-range aim of psycho
logical research is to arrive at scientific laws which
are then taken to explain behavior.
In one way or
another— but generally involving a mixture of material
found in psychological journals and patterns of thought
existing in the lay culture— the researcher arrives at
notions which he* regards as potentially interesting
explanations. Modest potential explanations are advanced
as hypotheses, more elaborate ones as theories. These
hypotheses and theories are then subjected to experi
mental test. The immediate aim of research is to try to
verify these hypotheses or theories as true. More or
less successfully verified theories are regarded as
psychological knowledge. And so on.
(Day, 1977, p. 4)
Day is offering here a characterization of scientific knowledge
as tied to a set of methodological practices, and he indicates that
the assumptions of methodological behaviorists regarding the nature
of knowledge in psychology can be revealed by looking at these
practices.

By doing so, one emerges with a view of scientific

knowledge which states that if one's knowledge claims are publiclyverifiable and testable, and if one conforms to professional research
practices, "knowledge" will automatically follow.
Before presenting some criticisms of the above view in prep
aration for a discussion of the radical behaviorist conceptualization
of scientific knowledge, I wish to describe briefly another aspect
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of methodological behaviorism which directly relates to the profes
sional and research values presented above.
"mentalism."

This is the concept of

Skinner (1945, 1964, 1974) has described mentalism

as the verbal practice of explaining behavior by reference to mental
events.

He has also stated that methodological behaviorism, by

refusing to consider mental (private) events as data because they
are not publicly-verifiable, actually encourages a form of mental
ism.

The adherence to objective (observable) behavior as data can

incorporate the idea that mental events exist, but they cannot
meaningfully be studied by science— a type of dualism.

Or, mental

events can be studied to the extent that they can be operationally
defined, and as such can be "inferred" from behavior, the actual
data base.

Thus, much psychological research is directed toward

the study of mental constructs, such as "expectation," "memory,"
or "inhibition," which are operationally defined by behavioral
indexes from which the functioning of such constructs is inferred.
Skinner (1974) and Day (1975a, 1976) have articulated the
problems associated with methodological behaviorism’s adherence to
a logical positivist operationism and its concommitant mentalism.
Skinner has again stressed the problem in terms of the status of
private events and self-observation as data.

He rejects the fruit

fulness of public-verifiability as a criterion for proper psycho
logical data, and instead psychologizes the concepts private events
and self-knowledge by looking at the behavioral realities underlying
such concepts.

In About Behaviorism he has this to say:
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The statement that behaviorists deny the existence
of feelings, sensations, ideas and other features of
mental life needs a good deal of clarification- Method
ological behaviorism and some versions of logical posi
tivism ruled private events out of bounds because there
could be no public agreement about their validity--Radical behaviorism, however, takes a different line.
It does not deny the possibility of self-observation
or self-knowledge or its possible usefulness, but it
questions the nature of what is felt or observed and
hence known....
Mentalism kept attention away from the external
antecedent events which might have explained behavior,
by seeming to supply an alternative explanation.
Methodological behaviorism did just the reverse: by
dealing exclusively with external antecedent events it
turned attention away from self-observation and selfknowledge.
Radical behaviorism restores some kind of
balance.
It does not insist on truth by agreement and
can therefore consider events taking place in the private
world within the skin. It does not dismiss them as
subjective.
It simply questions the nature of the
object observed and the reliability of the observations.
(Skinner, 1974, pp. 16-17)
Skinner's objection to mentalism rests on the fact that mentalistic
explanations, in taking mental events to be causes of behavior,
take our attention away from the role of the environment-behavior
interactions which are to be seen as offering a truly causal
account.

The emphasis here is on what kinds of events (or constructs)

are to play a role in the explanation of behavior.

Day (1975, 1976a)

f-as stated that it is not the use of mentalistic terms per se (such
as ideas, knowledge, beliefs, etc.) that constitutes mentalism but
the use of such terms in the explanation of behavior.

The central

opposition, then, is in giving mentalistic terms am ontological
status, rather than, as the radical behaviorist would do, treating
them as examples of verbal behavior which function in various ways,
or as private events which can enter into contingencies controlling

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

11
verbal behavior.
Before presenting the radical behaviorist view of the nature
of scientific knowledge, I wish to present one more criticism of
methodological behaviorism's adherence to a logical positivist
stance.
Koch (1964) has discussed the problems resulting from method
ological behaviorism's acceptance of logical positivism as a pre
scription for gaining scientific respectability.

While referring

to the fact that logical positivism, as a philosophy of science,
had a short-lived place in philosophy and is no longer considered
tenable, he is discussing also a set of larger cultural changes
in the analysis of meaning and conceptions of knowledge which
warrant, he feels, careful reconsideration of how psychology should
view its own conceptions and practices.

I will quote two fairly

lengthy passages from his paper in order to give the reader a clearer
understanding of how Koch views the problem, and also because his
discussion engages directly the issues central to the radical be
haviorist position on knowledge and scientific practice, in general.
[Speaking of psychologists} We are not known for our
readiness to be in the wavefront of history.
It could
almost be maintained that modern psychology ran out of
its independence at the moment of declaring it. In every
period of our history, we have looked to external sources
in the scholarly culture— especially natural science and
the philosophy of science— for our sense of direction.
And typically we have embraced policies long out of date
in those very sources. What is unique about our present
lag relative to the rest of scholarly culture is that
each branch of the latter seems to be either working
toward, or inviting into existence, a redefinition of
inquiry of a sort which must largely depend on psycho
logical modes of analysis. Indeed, extant efforts in
this direction everywhere involve psychological commit-
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ments, often of a rough and ready sort. Yet psychology
seems hardly cognizant of the challenge implicit in these
circumstances. Or of the circumstances.
More curiously still, the emerging redefinition of
knowledge is already at a phase, in its understanding
of the particularities of inquiry, which renders markedly
obsolete that view of science still regulative of
inquiring practice in psychology. This can be said in
utter literalness, for the view in question was imported,
with undisguised gratitude, from the philosophy of science
and related sources some three decades ago but, while
remaining more or less congealed in psychology, was
subjected to such attrition in those areas it can no
longer properly be said to exist. Psychology is thus in
the unenviable position of standing on philosophical
foundations which began to be vacated by philosophy almost
as soon as the former had borrowed them. The paradox
is now compounded: philosophy and, more generally, the
methodology of science are beginning to stand on found
ations that only psychology could render secure.
(Koch,
1964, pp. 4-5)
... [jrjhe picture of scientific method now beginning to
emerge among physicists, other natural scientists,
many philosophers of science, and others challenges
the behaviorist conception of science and the imported
methodological views on which it was based, at virtually
every point. The idea of behaviorism was that replica
bility of findings, reliability of prediction, and so
on, could be purchased only by use of fixed linkages
with "objective indicators"; by conformity to schemata
which assumed that elaboration, application, and veri
fication of a theory must take place in something like
a wholly articulate, wholly stated context of rules....
Among the re-analyses of inquiry that are now
shaping up there is no point-for-point consensus, but most
agree in stressing the absurdity in principle of any
notion of full formalization, in underlining the gap
between any linguistic "system" of assertions and the
unverbalized processes upon which its interpretation
and application (not to mention its formulation) are
contingent, in acknowledging the dependence of theory
construction and use at every phase on individual sensi
bility, discrimination, insight, judgment, guess. The
emerging redefinition of inquiry knocks away virtually
every one of the props on which the strange cautioninspired epistemology of the behaviorist has leaned.
Even the presumtive, borrowed prestige attaching to his
views is gone.
(Koch, 1964, pp. 21-22)
It is interesting that Koch, in calling for a reexamination
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of psychology's concepts of knowledge and methods of analysis,
rejects Skinner's view as a part of the tradition in psychology
which he is criticizing, yet his description of "the emerging
redefinition of inquiry" lies very close to the radical behaviorist
alternative.

This alternative revolves around looking at scienti

fic knowledge and practice in terms of the verbal and research
behaviors of scientists (psychologists) in the context of what has
been identified as a "functional analysis" or looking for control
ling contingencies between such behaviors and their environmental
and historical contexts.
I will later want to present Skinner's identification of
specific contingencies operating in the scientific or psychological
community with respect to research practice and verbal behavior
concerning methodological issues.

For the present, however, I wish

to stick to the problem of conceptualizing scientific knowledge as
a radical behaviorist.

I will do this by discussing three issues

which concern the notion of scientific knowledge:

(1) Skinner's

treatment of scientific knowledge as revealed in the distinction
between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behavior,

(2) Skinner's

reconceptualization of operationism as the functional analysis of
verbal behavior, and (3) "knowledge” as related to discriminative
verbal behavior involved in the identification of contingencies
operating to control behavior.

Knowledge as rules
For Skinner, scientific knowledge has often been conceptual-
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ized as that formalized system of "facts," "rules," or "laws" which
the scientific community generates in its descriptions of the world,
and which it uses to teach effective behavior (Skinner, 1969, pp.
159-160; 1974, p. 235).

These rules, as verbal behavior describing

contingencies of reinforcement, can come to control behavior (such
as in instruction, Skinner, 1957, pp. 362-365), and the behavior
they bring about may resemble behavior actually shaped by the
contingencies they describe.

The distinction between rule-governed

and contingency-shaped behavior is an important one.

Verbal

behavior (rules) can produce behavior similar to behavior shaped
by the contingencies themselves and allow an individual to acquire
behavior which he or she could not acquire otherwise.

Skinner has

called the rules which govern behavior "objective," largely because
such rules, when recorded, no longer depend upon the behavior of
a specific individual to have their effect and can enter into
the control of the behavior of individuals no longer in contact
with the original contingencies described by the rules.

He says;

In contrasting contingency-shaped and rule-governed
behavior we must take account of four things;
(1) A system which establishes certain contingencies
of reinforcement, such as some part of the natural
environment, a piece of equipment used in operant
research, or a verbal community.
(2) The behavior which is shaped and maintained
by these contingencies or which satisfies them in the
sense of being reinforced under them.
(3) Rules derived from the contingencies, in the
form of injunctions or descriptions which specify
occasions, responses, and consequences.
(4) The behavior evoked by the rules.
Items (2) and (4) are instances of behavior and,
as such, ephemeral and insubstantial. We observe an
organism in the act of behaving, but we study only the
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records which survive. Behavior is also subjective in
the sense that it is characteristic of a particular person
with a particular history. In contrast, (1) and (3) are
objective and durable. The reinforcing system in (1)
exists prior to any effect it may have upon an organism
and it can be observed in the same way by two or more
people. The rules of (3) are more or less permanent
verbal stimuli. It is not surprising, therefore, that
(2) and (4) often take second place to (1) and (3).
(1) is said to be what a person acquires "knowledge
about" and (3) is called "knowledge."
(Skinner, 1969,
pp. 159-160)
In About Behaviorism, in the section entitled "The Personal
Knowledge of the Scientist," Skinner discusses the role of rules
in generating effective scientific behavior in individuals:
The central question of scientific knowledge is not
What is known by scientists? but What does knowing mean?
The facts and laws of science are descriptions of the
world— that is, of prevailing contingencies of reinforce
ment. They make it possible for a person to act more
successfully than he could learn to do in one short
lifetime or ever through direct exposure to many kinds
of contingencies.
The objectivity which distinguishes rule-governed
behavior from behavior generated through direct exposure
to contingencies is furthered by tests of validity,
proof, practices minimizing personal influences, and
other parts of scientific method. Nevertheless, the
corpus of science— the tables of constants, the equations,
the laws— have no power of their own. They exist because
of their effects on people. Only a living person knows
science in the sense of acting under its control with
respect to nature
Knowledge is subjective in the
trivial sense of being the behavior of a subject, but
the environment, past or present, which determines the
behavior lies outside the behaving person.
... f>] scientist must behave as an individual. But
if he analyses the world around him, and if, as a result,
he states facts or laws which make it possible for others
to respond effectively without personal exposure to that
world, then he produces something in which he himself
is no longer involved. When many other scientists
arrive at the same facts or laws, any personal contribu
tion or personal participation is reduced to a minimum.
(Skinner, 1974, pp. 144-145)
The sense in which rules specifying contingencies and the
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behavior such rules generate are "objective" for Skinner is not to
be confused with methodological behaviorism's concern with "objective"
(as opposed to "subjective") data in psychology.

Objectivity for

Skinner is not a property of behavior, but rather is a description
given to particular types of events which come to control behavior.
Objectivity enters into a description of scientific knowledge in
the following way:
(1) The miles, laws, and facts of science are records of
verbal behavior and, as such, are visible and specifiable.

They

come to control behavior of individuals in the absence of contin
gencies which would shape the behavior.
(2) The verbal stimuli which generate rule-governed behavior
are not the same as the contingencies they describe.

The ability

to describe contingencies is not the same as acting under their
control.

The verbal behavior involved in specifying rules arises

because of other contingencies which make such specification im
portant, including the effects such rules have on the behavior of
others in bringing it under the control of relevant aspects of the
environment.
(3) Methods of science are designed to further the degree to
which the behavior of scientists is controlled by important aspects
of the environment rather than by variables which may interfere with
effective scientific action.

Such behavior can be called "objective"

in the sense of being under such control.

An individual may "demonstrate knowledge" by behaving in
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particular ways which the verbal community calls "knowing," and
this behavior may be either contingency-shaped or under the control

of rules.

But when certain contingencies operating in the verbal

community result in the verbalizations of relevant contingencies,
a special sense of "knowledge" is achieved, which for Skinner is
important because such verbal stimuli produce effective behavior
in individuals.
Scientific knowledge is verbal behavior, though not
necessarily linguistic.
It is a corpus of rules for
effective action, and there is a special sense in which
it could be "true" if it yields the most effective action
possible. But rules are never the contingencies they
describe; they remain descriptions and suffer the limit
ations inherent in verbal behavior.
— M
proposition is "true" to the extent that with
its help the listener responds effectively to the
situation it describes. The account given by the
speaker functions in lieu of the direct control of the
environment which has generated it, and the listener's
behavior can never exceed the behavior controlled by the
situation described.... The canons of scientific methods
are designed to maximize the control exerted by the
stimulus and to suppress other conditions, such as inci
dental effects upon the listener which lead the speaker
to exaggerate or lie.
(Skinner, 1974, p. 235)
In summary, Skinner makes a distinction between knowledge in
general, which can be identified with an individual's behavior in a
particular situation, and scientific knowledge, which is verbal
behavior in the form of "rules" that enable individuals to behave
effectively with respect to specific contingencies of reinforcement.
Contingencies in the world shape behavior, and the rules which
describe these contingencies produce similar behavior, but the rules
themselves are the records of verbal behavior which arise because
of their special effects on a listener or reader, and it is this
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special form of control which Skinner is interested in when speaking
of scientific knowledge.

Operational definition:

The functional analysis of verbal behavior

In his 1945 paper on operationism, mentioned earlier, Skinner
presented his view of operational definition.

We have seen how

the concept of operationism which psychology adopted involved a set
of practices whereby terms were to be defined through the use of
concrete, publicly-verifiable events which could then enter into
experimental procedures.

This move toward an "objective science"

was an attempt to assure that the psychological knowledge gained
was rigorous, empirical, and replicable.

Skinner, however, had a

different notion of what should constitute operationism in psychol
ogy.

His paper, entitled "The Operational Analysis of Psychological

Terms," rested on his previous and concurrent interest in the
functional analysis of verbal behavior.

(His book, Verbal Behavior,

published in 1957, had been taking form since he was a graduate
student in the 1930's.)

His treatment of operationism has a special

significance here, both because it challenges traditional notions
of how scientific knowledge is to be gained and because it provides
an example of how Skinner, in dealing with concepts and practices
central to psychology, is interested in uncovering the behavioral
realities which underlie such concepts and practices by looking at
how they function in human life.

His reconceptualization also

offers a method whereby "meaning" is brought out of the realm of
mentalistic verbal practices and is given an empirical, psychological
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base.

His central position can be seen in the following passage:
A considerable advantage is gained by dealing with
terms, concepts, constructs, and so on, quite frankly
in the form in which they are observed— namely, as verbal

responses

Meanings, contents, and references are to

be found among the determiners, not among the properties,
of response. The question "What is length?" would appear
to be satisfactorily answered by listing the circum
stances under which the response "length" is emitted
(or, better, by giving some general description of such
circumstances). (Skinner, 1945, p. 271)

For Skinner, then, to define the meaning of a term is to look at
the contingencies operating when the term (or piece of verbal

behavior) is emitted.

To understand the term "scientific knowledge"

one would look at the types of circumstances in which a scientist
would be described as "knowing" something.

This move throws us

back on the verbal behavior of scientists— that behavior in which
"knowledge claims" can be said to exist:
To be consistent the psychologist must deal with his
own verbal practices by developing an empirical science
of verbal behavior. He cannot, unfortunately, join the
logician in defining a definition, for example, as a
"rule for the use of a term" (Feigl); he must turn instead
to the contingencies of reinforcement which account for
the functional relation between a term, as a verbal
response, and a given stimulus. This is the "operational
basis" for his use of terms; and it is not logic but
science.
(Skinner, 1945, p. 277)
I will return to Skinner's interest in the empirical analysis
of verbal behavior.

For the present, however, I wish to offer some

additional material from Skinner's 1945 paper which bears on method
ological behaviorism's view that objective data in psychology are
necessarily publicly-observable behavior, and that such a data-base
is desirable because the verbal community can agree on the truth
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or falsity of a phenomenon defined in publicly-verifiable terms.
Towards the end of his paper Skinner says:
The public-private distinction emphasizes the arid
philosophy of "truth by agreement." The public, in fact,
turns out to be simply that which can be agreed upon
because it is common to two or more agreers. This is
not an essential part of operationism; on the contrary,
operationism permits us to dispense with this most unsat
isfactory solution to the problem of truth--The ultimate criterion for the goodness of a concept is
not whether two people are brought into agreement but
whether the scientist who uses the concept can operate
successfully upon his material— all by himself if need
be.
(Skinner, 1945, p. 293)
The public-private distinction apparently leads
to a logical, as distinct from a psychological, analysis
of the verbal behavior of the scientist, although I see
no reason why it should. Perhaps it is because the sub
jectivist is still not interested in terms but in what
the terms are used to stand for. The only problem which
a science of behavior must solve in connection with
subjectivism is in the verbal field. How can we account
for the behavior of talking about mental events? The
solution must by psychological, rather than logical, and
I have tried to suggest one approach in my present paper.
(Skinner, 1945, p. 294)
To summarize, Skinner's treatment of operational definition
revolves around the functional analysis of verbal behavior— the
meaning of a scientific term is discovered by finding the factors
which operate in its control.

This reconceptualization of operation

al definition offers a distinct challenge to methodological behav
iorism's view that scientific knowledge can be gained through a
definition of terms based upon a specification of the operations
used in their measurement.

Such a view does not consider the

environmental context in which such terms occur, and it treats
psychological terms as essentially language devices which refer to
processes or events in such a way that the meaning of such terms
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can be agreed upon by a given community.

For Skinner, the verbal

behavior of scientists is simply that— behavior— and it occurs in
a context of functional contingencies.

Behavior itself is neither

subjective nor objective, but verbal behavior involved in talking
about "subjective” events can be dealt with in the same way as any
other verbal behavior by identifying the circumstances which
function in its control.

Knowledge as discriminative responding
The knowledge demonstrated by an individual— his or her
behavior, verbal and otherwise, with respect to the world— is
operant behavior, made possible by a history of reinforcement.

An

important characteristic of most operant behavior is that, through
differential reinforcement, it comes under the control of specific
aspects of the environment.

The control exerted by the environ

ment in this sense is discriminative control, and behavior under
such control shows a particular sensitivity to the environment in
which, it occurs.

Such behavior is called by Skinner discriminative

behavior (see Skinner, 1953, pp. 260-261).

Skinner's description

of the term "contingency of reinforcement" exemplifies this rela
tionship between controlling events and behavior:
We describe the contingency by saying that a stimulus
is the occasion upon which a response — is followed
by reinforcement
We must specify all three terms....
Operant behavior almost necessarily comes under this
kind of stimulus control, since only a few responses
are automatically reinforced by the organism's own body
without respect to external circumstances. Reinforcement
achieved by adjusting to a given environment almost
always requires the sort of physical contact which we
call stimulation. The environmental control has an
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obvious biological significance. If all behavior were
equally likely to occur on all occasions, the result
would be chaotic(Skinner, 1953, p. 108)
Discriminative responding, which shows a controlling relation
ship between aspects of the environment (discriminative stimuli)
and behavior, is a fundamental concept for Skinner.

Contingencies

which "select" behavior in the presence of certain events or
properties result in such repertoires as those described by
"abstraction," in which verbal behavior is brought under the control
of a single property or combination or properties; i.e., the
response "red," (Skinner, 1953, pp. 134-136) and "self-knowledge,"
in which verbal behavior comes under the control of other discrim
inative behavior of the individual (Skinner, 1953, pp. 264-266).
The complex behaviors of observation, description, and evaluation
that are involved in carrying out and reporting research all can be
seen to involve discriminative behavior on the part of individual
scientists.

That is, highly complex responses occur in relation to

specific environmental events.

The differential control of the

environment which operates on the discriminative behavior of the
researcher is demonstrated in Skinner's discussion of rate as a
datum:
In choosing rate of responding as a basic datum and in
recording this conveniently in a cumulative curve, we
make important temporal aspects of behavior visible.
Once this has happened, our scientific practice is
reduced to simple looking. A new world is opened to
inspection.
(Skinner, 1956, p. 229)
"Simple looking" is discriminative behavior on the part of an
individual, as can be seen in Skinner's discussion of "seeing,"
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"perceiving," and "knowing" in Science and Human Behavior;
The functional control exerted by a stimulus
enables us to distinguish between sensing and certain
other activities suggested by such terms as "seeing,"
"perceiving," or "knowing." "Sensing" may be taken
to refer to the mere reception of stimuli.
"Seeing"
is the "interpretive" behavior which a stimulus controls.
The term "seeing" characterizes a special relation
between behavior and stimuli.
It is different from
"sensing" just as responding is different from being
stimulated. Our "perception" of the world— our "know
ledge" of it— is our behavior with respect to the
world.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 140)
The visibility of changes in a cumulative curve enables the
researcher to respond discriminatively such that relevant variables
operating in the functional control of behavior can be identified,
and such identifications then enter into further verbal practices
involved in reporting and evaluating research results.

The basic

point I wish to make here is that the ways in which individuals
respond to the world, their behavior with respect to the environ
ment, is centered around their abilities, brought about by
differential reinforcement, to respond discriminatively.
Part of the contingencies operating upon individual psychol
ogists to produce the kinds of verbal behavior which are indicative
of scientific knowledge is the action of what Skinner has called
the "verbal community."

It is this community, our social and

professional environment, which shapes our capacities for observa
tion, description, and "professional talk" concerning proper
scientific aims and practices.

For the radical behaviorist, the

verbal community, of which Skinner's writings are largely a part,
has shaped what could be described as an interest in the analysis
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of controlling contingencies.

As specified in the above quotation

by Skinner, these contingencies are conceptualized as relationships
between behavior, the antecedent environmental context in which it
occurs ("stimulus control"), and salient historical and contextual
consequences of the behavior ("reinforcement").

The identification

of controlling contingencies involves the ability of an observer to
respond discriminatively to environmental events that are taken to
be relevant in the control of particular instances of behavior.
Day (1975b) has discussed this point as follows:
- M t is important to recognize that the specification
of the components said to be a part of a contingency of
reinforcement generally involves conceptual complexity.
Even the attempt to "observe" the operation of contin
gencies in the stream of behavior involves such concep
tual complexity.
This is because the observation of
behavior consists solely of discriminative responding
to the behavior at hand in its environmental setting,
and this discriminative responding is generally under
multiple stimulus control. The interpretation of behavior
in terms of contingencies is regarded as no more than
the emission of discriminative behavior on the part of
the interpreter, where the repertoires involved are
taken as having been made available to him from his
previous reinforcement history.
In this way conceptual
complexity is generated.
(Day, 1975b, p. 2)
The special verbal repertoires which Skinner has identified as
scientific knowledge are no different than other discriminative
behavior but are distinguished by the fact that scientific verbal
behavior functions in the control of behavior of individuals in
particular ways to lead to effective action.

The radical behavior

ist concern with the identification of controlling contingencies
leads to verbalizations of certain kinds, involving claims con
cerning variables which are discriminated as being relevant to the
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emission of behavior.

These verbalizations are, in a real sense,

knowledge claims, and it can be said that the radical behaviorist
regards "knowledge" as information about controlling relations which
is obtained by observing behavior in context and responding discrim
inatively to the phenomena that are there to be observed.

This

discriminative responding then enters into further discriminative
behavior having to do with describing research practices, presenting
evidence, discussing lawful relationships, and evaluating research
results.
"Information about contingencies," then, is the verbal behavior
of individuals when behaving discriminatively in a certain way to
environment-behavior relationships.

A full analysis of scientific

knowledge would involve looking at knowledge claims as verbal
behavior, and assessing the variables of which it is a function.
Skinner has called for such an analysis in Verbal Behavior;
What are the defining properties of scientific— verbal
behavior? When is such behavior effective or valid?
How do the practices of the community generate and main
tain it? How do these practices work? Can scientific
verbal behavior be improved, and if so, what practices
would bring about improvement?—
The verbal processes
of...scientific thought deserve and require a more precise
analysis than they have yet received. One of the ulti
mate accomplishments of a science of verbal behavior
may b e
a descriptive and analytical scientific epistemology, the terms and practices of which will be adapted
to human behavior as a subject matter.
(Skinner, 1957,
pp. 430-431)
In summary, for the radical behaviorist knowledge in general,
and scientific knowledge in particular, is a behavioral matter.
The radical behaviorist conceptualizes knowledge as the behavior of
individuals when behaving discriminatively to the world, and this
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is a different conceptualization of the nature of knowledge from
that held in traditional accounts.

Methodological behaviorism

supports a view of knowledge whereby knowledge is the result of
careful and objective definition of terms, adherence to precise and
accepted research practices, and logical deduction from experimental
findings.

The force of Skinner's reconceptualization of knowledge

is that the basis of all knowledge is seen as discriminative
responding, which can enter into further verbal practices operating
in the scientific community to produce particular effects, and this
view does not commit the radical behaviorist to any particular
set of rules concerning how research should be performed.

Instead,

verbal behavior which is the result of research may be looked at
according to its function in the scientific community and the
variables which enter into its control.

Contingencies which actually

govern scientific behavior could be identified, and radical behavior
ism offers a way of looking at the empirical realities of scientific
practice.

In the next -.action I will be interested in looking at

"experimentalism" as a part of scientific practice and in presenting
a characterization of experimental research practice which is con
sistent with the conceptualization of knowledge, derived from a
radical behaviorist perspective, described above.

The Nature of Experimental Methodology
The traditional view of scientific knowledge has rested on
considerations of what it means to be objective in scientific
practice.

The historical value of experimental methods as the means
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whereby objective truths in science can be revealed has been adopted
by psychology as a part of its objectivist stance.

This means to

a large extent that psychology, and methodological behaviorism in
particular, is committed to a set of methodological procedures
which are endorsed as the way by which useful knowledge about a
particular problem or subject matter can be gained, and which play
a part in professional values concerning proper research conduct in
psychology.

The value can be stated as follows:

the scientific

method (experimentalism) with its concern with controlled observa
tion and manipulation is an established set of procedures by which
psychological research becomes linked with the scientific process.
The previous section set forth a view of knowledge as consis
tent with the behavior of individuals when responding in certain
ways, and it indicated that the behavior of researchers in response
to a research situation can be looked at to gain an understanding
of scientific knowledge.

Not only do researchers respond to their

research situations, they do so in a way which produces verbal behav
ior indicative of scientific knowledge, and this involves a consid
eration of how scientific verbal behavior functions within the
professional community.

The purpose of this section is to look at

experimental methodology in the context of Skinner's conceptualiza
tion of scientific knowledge in order to discuss (1) how experimental
methods effect the behavior of researchers to produce useful dis
criminations and (2) how the behavior of researchers which results
from experimental investigations enters into the production of
scientific knowledge.

The first point will be discussed primarily
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in the context of Skinner's treatment of the function of experimental
procedures; the second point will involve a consideration of what
it means to provide evidence in scientific practice.

Experimentalism
Experimental methods in psychology generally involve (1) the
isolation of environmental variables or events whose effects on
behavior are to be assessed,

(2) the systematic manipulation of

these variables or events in a controlled context, and (3) the
assessment of the relationship between values of such variables and
behavior.

Traditionally experimental procedures have been identified

with a hypothesis-testing model of science, but this is not
necessary (see Sidman, 1960, pp. 4-40).

Individuals interested in

the experimental analysis of behavior are likely to conceptualize
their research as an inductive enterprise based upon the finding of
regularities between behavior and certain aspects of its environ
mental context.

Skinner's interest in the development of a science

of behavior involves a concern with the finding of such regularities,
and he is committed to the methods of science (experimentalism) as
the way to proceed.

The following passages from Science and Human

Behavior are illustrative of his position:
We need not defend the methods of science in their
application to behavior. The experimental and mathemat
ical techniques used in discovering and expressing uni
formities are the common property of science in general.
Almost every discipline has contributed to this pool of
resources, and all disciplines borrow from it. The
advantages are well established.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 16)
In the laboratory many conditions are simplified and
irrelevant conditions often eliminated. But what value
are laboratory studies if we must predict and control
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behavior where a comparable simplification is impossible?
It is true that we can gain control over behavior only
insofar as we can control the factors responsible for it.
What a scientific study does is enable us to make optimal
use of the control we possess. The laboratory simplifi
cation reveals the relevance of factors which we might
otherwise overlook.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 21)
An understanding of the importance of experimental methods
for Skinner involves a consideration of the function of such methods
in the control of the behavior of researchers.

The techniques of

research design involving experimental manipulation, control, and
measurement have evolved, as Skinner has often pointed out, for
practical reasons (Skinner, 1953, pp. 12-14; 1957, pp. 418-420,
428-431; 1974, pp. 228-229).

These involve professional values of

accuracy in reporting, of minimizing personal influences and
maximizing objective evidence concerning a given phenomenon, and of
increasing the effectiveness of human beings with respect to the
world.

Some of the function of experimental methods in controlling

scientific behavior in accordance with such values can be seen in
the following discussion by Skinner of "important characteristics
of science":
In the long run, the issue is not so much one of personal
prestige as of effective procedure.
Scientists have
simply found that being honest— with oneself as much as
with others— is essential to progress. Experiments do
not always come out as one expects, but the facts must
stand and the expectations fall. The subject matter, not
the scientist, knows best. The same practical conse
quences have created the scientific atmosphere in which
statements are constantly submitted to check, where
nothing is put above a precise description of the facts,
and where facts are accepted no matter how distasteful
their momentary consequences.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 13)
Another way in which experimental methods function to produce
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effective behavior in researchers interested in the functional
analysis of behavior is that they allow the experimenter to "see"
the relationships between behavior and aspects of its environmental
context.

Experimental procedures, through the isolation and manip

ulation of particular events, bring the researcher's discriminative
behavior under the control of important aspects of the environment
which operate in the functional control of the behavior of organisms
... (Experimental methods bring responses under a stricter
stimulus control by manipulating states of affairs so
that relevant properties are emphasized.
(Skinner, 1957,
p. 428)
This last point is important in view of an understanding of
scientific knowledge as discriminative behavior on the part of
researchers or scientists.

Skinner's perspective is such that

experimental methods are valued because they operate in the control
of scientific behavior in particular ways; they make discriminations
of relationships between aspects of the environment and behavior
more precise by bringing the discriminative behavior of researchers
under the specific control of manipulated values of stimuli and
corresponding changes in the behavior of interest.
The discriminative behavior of researchers in response to a
particular research situation is, in part, verbal behavior.

When

a researcher "identifies" changes in behavior in relation to
changes in certain independent variables, it is the verbal behavior
of the researcher that is largely changed.

He or she "discovers"

a functional relationship, orderly relations are "described" in a
precise or new way, or certain practical problems (such as in
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applied behavior analysis) are "clarified" or "solved."

Experimental

methods which bring the verbal behavior of researchers under specific
stimulus control of aspects of the research situation are valued,
then, because the verbal behavior which follows has particular
effects; it satisfies certain professional contingencies that control
interests in problem-solving, clarification of phenomena, discovery
of new facts, and so on.
Another function of experimental methods has to do with
guaranteeing the "factual" nature of scientific verbal behavior.
Discriminative verbal behavior that comes under the control of
precise experimental conditions and resultant changes in behavior
has the advantage that the control in such instances is specifiable.
Values of independent variables and changes in a cumulative record
or graph which represents behavior over time not only control the
researcher's discriminative responses, they are reported in such
a way that the professional community can make similar discrimina
tive responses to the phenomena the research is designed to investi
gate.

Techniques of research design lend credibility to phenomena

by increasing the probability that changes in behavior are a function
of the variables manipulated.

Techniques of experimental method

ology thus have the effect of bringing professional verbal behavior
under the control of specific environment-behavior relationships
while irrelevant sources of control are diminished.
A researcher responds to the data which result from research
investigations with verbal behavior that can be termed "descriptive"
in the sense of being tinder specific stimulus control of aspects of
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the research situation.

Yet the results of research are more than

simple reporting of such discriminations.

Researchers engage in

further verbal behavior having to do with evaluation and confidence
in research results.

They are concerned with providing "evidence”

for their knowledge claims, and here the function of scientific
verbal behavior in the context of the professional community must be
considered.

Evidence
The basic discriminative responses made to a research situation
enter into further verbal behavior, largely derived from other verbal
behavior in the field, such as relevant research literature.

This

professional verbal behavior can be described in many ways— as
explanations offered, as discussions of what the research results
prove, or as evidence for or against a particular psychological
theory or stance.

Research reports generally include this kind of

verbal activity which is concerned with what a particular piece of
research "means" in the broader professional context.

The notion of

evidence is applicable here since the verbal practices involved
function in particular ways to have certain effects on a listener
or reader; "evidence" is given for a particular approach which
includes verbalizations of discriminations made to the specific
research situation in question and ways of talking about or making
sense of the phenomenon investigated.
The notion of evidence is closely tied to what Skinner calls
the process of "confirmation"

(Skinner, 1957, pp. 425-428), and his
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discussion offers a conceptualization of how evidence functions in
the psychological community.

In Verbal Behavior Skinner describes

the function of this process:
When new verbal behavior has been constructed, it
must often be "confirmed." The process is not limited
to constructed sentences. We confirm any verbal response
when we generate additional variables to increase its
probability. Thus, our guess that something seen at a
distance is a telescope is confirmed by moving closer
until a weak response I_ think i t 1s a^ telescope may be
replaced by the strong I_ know i t 1s a_ telescope. Simi
larly, our guess that a rather unfamiliar object is a
kind of telescope is confirmed if we find that it can be
used as such. In using it successfully, we provide
additional stimulation for the unextended tact telescope.
(Skinner, 1957, p. 425)
...[t ] he speaker or listener may confirm the response
by accumulating variables which raise its probability
to a maximum
Qwjhat is usually meant by confirma
tion is the generation of the response as a tact--To such responses the listener reacts with maximal
(but, of course, by no means necessarily complete)
confidence.
(Skinner, 1957, p. 428)
Skinner is talking about the stimulus control over verbal
behavior.

Confirmation involves strengthening verbal behavior by

the addition of variables which bring the behavior more specifically
under the control of relevant environmental circumstances.

Scienti

fic practices involved in "giving evidence" strengthen verbal
behavior of researchers and others interested in the research by
bringing it more tightly under the control of the circumstances
relevant to the phenomenon of interest.

We are more likely to

"believe" the results, and we are more likely to describe or explain
the phenomenon in ways originally offered.
The provision of evidence involves generating variables which
strengthen a particular set of responses to the phenomenon the
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research is designed to investigate.

The simple description of the

experimental variables manipulated, the manner in which they were
manipulated, and the resultant changes in behavior, the presentation
of similar research results and professional discussion which share
certain characteristics with the research and problem at hand, and
the use of accepted professional methods of establishing the
reliability of data all function to strengthen certain verbal
responses of the reader or listener in such a way as to bring them
under the control of particular environmental circumstances and
points of view.

Evidence of this kind is valued largely because of

its effectiveness in generating verbal responses, by the addition of
sources of strength, which prove useful both in "making sense" out of
phenomena and in shaping up relevant discriminations to the phenom
ena of interest.
A reader or listener brings a certain verbal history to his or
her understanding of a particular piece of research, and the verbal
stimuli associated with research reports will be more or less
effective depending on the verbal repertoire already "possessed."
The verbal report will be judged "right," "true," or "important" to
the extent that it is effective in strengthening verbal responses
to the circumstances associated with the research which are similar
to those of the researcher (see Skinner, 1957, pp. 275-280).
Scientific knowledge, as verbal behavior in the form of facts,
rules, laws, statements of relationships, or theories, arises as
discriminative behavior to the world science investigates.

Contin

gencies which operate both within and without a specific research
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situation to make the verbal behavior of scientists precise, to bring
verbal responses Tinder relevant stimulus control, and to create
additional verbal behavior which brings the responses of readers or
listeners under similar stimulus control advance scientific knowledge
by advancing the discriminative capacities of the scientific
community.

By looking at the function of particular aspects of

experimental methodology and the contingencies which operate in the
production of scientific verbal behavior, individuals interested in
a behavioral functional analysis could greatly illuminate the
processes whereby scientific knowledge is generated.

Experimental methodology:

An overview

In the preceding sections I have discussed Skinner's conceptu
alization of experimental methodology and the function of evidence
in the scientific community.

This discussion has been general.

I have not attempted to look at specific aspects of scientific
practice in any detail, but I have been interested in conceptual
izing research methodology as a set of procedures which function
in particular ways on the behavior of individuals.
A formalized system of research methodology is not the same
thing as the practices themselves— what researchers actually do.
Skinner has addressed this problem as follows:
If we are interested in perpetuating the practices
responsible for the present corpus of scientific know
ledge, we must keep in mind that some very important
parts of the scientific process do not now lend them
selves to mathematical, logical, or any other formal
treatment. We do not know enough about human behavior
to know how the scientist does what he does. Although
statisticians and methodologists may seem to tell us, or
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at least imply, how the mind works— how problems arise,
how hypotheses axe formed, deductions made, and crucial
experiments designed— we as psychologists are in a position
to remind them that they do not have methods appropriate
to the empirical observation or the functional analysis
of such data. These are aspects of human behavior, and
no one knows better than we how little can at the moment
be said about them.
(Skinner, 1956, pp. 221-222)
In A Case Study in Scientific Method (1956) Skinner outlines
some of the events which made up his early research activities.
From the article one emerges with a picture of scientific practice
in which the researcher is interested in looking at behavior, seeing
orderly changes, and responding to the results of research in a
fairly spontaneous, contingency-shaped way rather than to a set
of rules about how research should proceed.

The interesting thing

about the article is that Skinner looks at his own research behavior
and describes some of the events which entered into its control.
He concludes:
It is perhaps natural that psychologists should
awaken only slowly to the possibility that behavioral
processes may be directly observed, or that they should
only gradually put the older statistical and theoretical
techniques in their proper perspective. But it is time
to insist that science does not progress by carefully
designed steps called "experiments" each of which has a
well-defined beginning and end. Science is a continuous
and often a disorderly and accidental process. We shall
not do the young psychologist any favor if we agree to
reconstruct our practices to fit the pattern demanded
by current scientific methodology.
(Skinner, 1956, p. 232)
The direct observation of behavior is important to Skinner and
to radical behaviorists.

Too often in reading research reports

one is left with little idea what the behavior in question actually
looked like in the context in which it occurred.

The importance of

finding ways to look at behavior and the factors in the environment
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of which it is a function is clear when one considers that the func
tion of research is to shape discriminative capacities, both in the
researcher and in a listener or reader.

Methodologies which have

been or will be developed to enable both the researcher and the
reader to make contact with behavior-in-context make possible
relevant discriminations of functional relations as responses to the
research situation itself rather than to preconceived notions of
what will happen or to other verbal behavior not "tied down" to the
phenomena that are there to be observed.
One implication of Skinner's view is that the practices of
researchers themselves can be observed.

If statistics reveal

important information about behavior, what is this information and
how does it function to increase knowledge of a subject matter?

If

experimental methods produce important discriminations, how do they
do so?

A methodology based on a description of actual research

behavior may reveal functional relationships of which psychologists
may not presently be aware.
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CHAPTER II
A RADICAL BEHAVIORIST EPISTEMOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to present and summarize a view
of behaviorist epistemology that is consistent with Skinner's
position, particularly that presented in Verbal Behavior.

In order

to do this, I will be discussing how Skinner's epistemological
stance differs from traditional perspectives.

I will also be

interested in addressing certain issues related to epistemological
considerations:

namely, the importance of a radical behaviorist

epistemology and some implications which follow from such a view
for professional considerations of scientific activity.

The

discussion in this chapter is presented in order to give the reader
a clearer understanding of conceptual issues relevant to Skinner's
treatment of verbal behavior.

It is also intended to provide a

basis for a review of some research on verbal behavior to be
presented in Chapter III.

Traditional Views of Epistemology
Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is generally con
cerned with "the nature and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions
and basis, and the general reliability of claims to knowledge"
(Hamlyn, 1967, pp. 8-9).

The study of epistemology is particularly

a philosophical enterprise, and epistemology comprises a large sub
field within professional philosophy.

It is not my purpose here to

discuss epistemological views as they have evolved in philosophy.
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Rather, I will briefly present two main epistemological positions
which are relevant to a discussion of the epistemology of science
adopted by psychology.
Historically, there are two basic epistemological perspectives
which can be contrasted within the history of philosophy:

rational

ism and empiricism (Ross, 1971, pp. 21-22; Eacker, 1975, pp. 133134).

These views are concerned with answering the question:

is knowledge gained?"

"How

The view of rationalism is that all knowledge

is a result of individuals' powers of reason, logic, and deduction.
The view of empiricism is that all knowledge is a result of
individuals' experiences, derived through the senses, and induction
from these experiences.

Both positions are interested in articula

ting the relationship between knowledge claims and the world.

That

is, they are concerned with how language practices can reflect
scientific truth.
Scientific epistemology has generally involved a mixture of
these two views.

Empiricism has given science its commitment to

controlled observation based on sense experience.

From rationalism,

science has adopted its reliance on deductive reasoning and mathe
matical representations (Eacker, 1975, p. 134).

The importance of

sensation and experience as the basis for knowledge was emphasized
by Locke, who was influential in the development of British
empiricism and the formation of modern experimental psychology in
the tradition of Wundt (Boring, 1950, pp. 168-176).

The scientific

method, as it has emerged from these traditions, has become an
expression of the epistemology of science and psychology.

That is.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

40
through controlled observation, recording of data and logical
deduction from articulated theories or hypotheses knowledge is gain
ed:
For most psychologists, the means by which we know
is the methodology of science, although that may not be
immediately obvious to students in psychology. Neverthe
less, when psychologists are asked how they know something
about behavior, for example, they most often refer to
data obtained under controlled conditions of observation.
Consequently, it would seem that the methodology of
psychology is its epistemology, or its theory of know
ledge; that is, the epistemology of psychology, as well
as the other sciences, is the epistemology of science,
and it, in turn, is the methodology of science.
(Eacker,
1975, p. 131)
•--El here does appear to be some element of commonality
across the various statements of scientific methodology.
It is that, at some point, the conjectures or speculations
of a scientist are submitted to some sort of empirical
test under controlled conditions of observation. Perhaps
that is about as much as can be said about the "essence"
of scientific methodology or the epistemology of science
at the present time.
(Eacker, 1975, p. 133)
In summary, traditional views of epistemology can be character
ized as follows:
(1) Epistemological issues have been approached analytically,
as in identifying those conditions which are necessary for knowledge
to occur (see Hamlyn, 1967) rather than as questions of human
behavior.
(2) The basic epistemological assumption has been that the
world is what science is about, and it is there to be known through
methods of observation and test (Ross, 1971, pp. 36-37).

The next

section will consider Skinner's alternative view.

A Radical Behaviorist View of Epistemology
A radical behaviorist epistemology revolves around Skinner's
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views of verbal behavior.

The best and most extensive source of

Skinner's treatment of verbal behavior is his book by the same name
(Verbal Behavior, 1957).

In an epilogue to the book, Skinner

discusses the nature of verbal behavior, particularly his own:
Behaving about behaving raises the same difficulty as
knowing about knowing. Russell pictures the behaviorist
deciding whether the doings of animals show knowledge or
error instead of, as is more likely, measuring predisposi
tions to act with respect to a given set of circumstances,
and he describes the behaviorist as "reporting his obser
vations about the outer world," although observation is
suspiciously like "idea," or at least "image," and would
probably be avoided in favor of an expression like
"reaction to the outer world." But the crux of the
problem survives in translation. The present study offers
a case in point. If what I have said is reasonably
correct, considering the present state of knowledge in
the science of human behavior, what interpretation is to
be placed on my behavior in writing this book? I have
been behaving verbally and, unless my analysis is defi
cient at some point, my behavior must have followed the
processes already set forth and no others.
(Skinner,
1957, pp.' 453-454)
Skinner goes on to describe some of his behavior in writing the
book and some of the reactions he hopes the reader will have to
the verbal stimuli in the book.

He concludes:

In many ways, then, this seems to me to be a better
way of talking about verbal behavior, and that is why
I have tried to get the reader to talk about it in this
way too. But have I told the truth? Who can say? A
science of verbal behavior probably makes no provision
for truth or certainty (though we cannot even be certain
of the truth of that). (Skinner, 1957, p. 456)
Skinner's treatment of verbal behavior— that verbal behavior
is behavior just like any other behavior and that it is subject to
the same type of contingency analysis as any other behavior— leads
to a particular epistemological point of view.

That is, the verbal

behavior of scientists— their knowledge of the world— has no special
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status and is of no different kind than other types of behavior,
verbal or otherwise-

It is subject to particular forms of control

which have evolved as scientific practice.

It is also productive

of certain kinds of effects on the scientific community.

What this

means is that logical analyses of the nature of knowledge or the
form of knowledge claims are inappropriate to an understanding of
epistemological issues.

The issues themselves are behavioral

matters which can be best formulated by looking at the empirical
realities of the contingencies operating to control verbal behavior,
especially the verbal behavior of scientists.
The connection between the world (what is "known”) and verbal
behavior ("knowing") is not revealed by looking at how language
practices can reveal truths about environmental phenomena that
exist independently of any human involvement.

The crucial episte

mological move made by Skinner is that verbal behavior is connected
to the world through the action of controlling contingencies, which
determine both the form and the effect or function of verbal
responses within a social context.

Knowledge, then, is not a

passive entity in itself but is rather a human activity which occurs
as a result of particular historical and situational interactions
of individuals with their environment:
The functional relations between behavior and the
environment are usually complex and very often confusing,
but we are not in doubt as to their dimensions or the
techniques with which they may be studied. We can dis
regard the troublesome dissection of human thought into
the familiar pattern of (1) a man possessing (2) knowledge
of (3) a world. Men are part of the world, and they
interact with other parts of it, including other men.
As their behavior changes, they may interact more effec-
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tively, gaining control and power. Their "knowledge" is
their behavior with respect to themselves and the rest of
the world and can be studied as such.
(Skinner, 1957,
p. 451)

The Importance of a Radical Behaviorist Epistemology
In Skinner's conclusion to the first epilogue in Verbal Behavior,
quoted above, he conceptualizes his treatment of verbal behavior as
"a better way of talking."

The reasons for this have to do with

the effects of certain "ways of talking" on the behavior of
individuals:
The responses which I have tried to get the reader to
make function by singling out events or aspects of verbal
behavior which should make his subsequent behavior more
expedient.
I have emphasized certain facts and ignored
others. The justification for this has been that the
facts emphasized seemed to belong together and that in
talking about them to the exclusion of other facts, greater
progress is made toward a unified account.
(Skinner, 1957,
p. 456)
Skinner is emphasizing here the fact that verbal behavior has
particular effects, both upon the speaker and the listener or
reader.

A conceptualization of epistemology that is consistent

with a functional analysis of verbal behavior as behavior leads to
certain changes in the behavior of individuals, largely due to the
fact that certain discriminative capacities are shaped as a result.
The verbal behavior of scientists in making sense of what they
do— how research should be conducted, what problems need to be
addressed, and how scientific behavior should be conceptualized—
is the result of particular contingencies of reinforcement, and it
also produces certain effects.

An approach to scientific activity

which is, in part, based on a radical behaviorist epistemology is
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important largely because of these effects.

That is, our conceptual

systems (our verbal behavior) effect our professional behavior in
many ways.
Part of the result of a radical behaviorist perspective is that
professional behavior is brought more specifically under the control
of important relationships between the environment and behavior,
including the behavior of scientists.

A radical behaviorist

epistemology emphasizes the importance of the environment in shaping
the discriminative capacities of scientists, and such a view may
have the effect that individuals will begin to "look for" relevant
contingencies which control professional behavior, including
contingencies created by particular methodologies and research
strategies.

Such an investigation would be very different from

the kinds of logical analyses of scientific methodology usually
offered.
Skinner's interest in developing a science of verbal behavior
is tied to his interest in the analysis of behavior-in-general.
That is, to the extent that scientists can come to understand their
own behavior and the contingencies operating in its control, the
more likely it is that effective practices can be developed to deal
with the wide range of behavioral phenomena that exist.

Implications for Scientific Practice
A radical behaviorist epistemology leads to a particular view
of scientific activity that may have certain implications for how
scientific practices and methods are conceptualized and carried out.
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Scientific activity is seen as involving the discriminative behavior
of individual scientists and an understanding of scientific behavior
would involve looking at the contingencies which shape this behavior
and bring it under the control of relevant aspects of the phenomena
science investigates.

In addition, the ways in which scientists

engage in verbal practices having to do with the validity of their
claims, proper methods for research, and the value of particular
points of view are seen as having been shaped by certain professional
contingencies and, hopefully, these contingencies result in behavior
which is effective, both in the sense of being under the control of
"the facts" and in shaping relevant discriminative behavior in
others.
Scientific methodologies are tied to epistemological issues
largely because of their status as an important source of controlling
contingencies over the behavior of researchers.

In the preceding

chapter, experimental procedures were discussed as providing
certain kinds of control over scientific behavior.

Not all useful

scientific verbal behavior is a result of exposure to experimental
contingencies, however.

Methodologies vary according to the degree

of experimental control used, the complexity of the phenomena
investigated, the context in which the research takes place,
whether or not variables are systematically manipulated, and so on
(see Skinner, 1953, pp. 37-39).

These differences in methodologies

are differences in contingencies operating on the behavior of
individual researchers.

The resulting discriminative behavior of

the researcher will occur in response to those aspects of the
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phenomena investigated which the particular contingencies operating
in the research situation "allow" to be discriminated in conjunction

with the individual's current repertoire.

Controlled experimental

research results in particular kinds of discriminative responding,
usually to specific or subtle aspects of behavior-in-context.

The

control over a researcher's discriminative behavior is always
present, however, and aspects of environment-behavior relationships
may be responded to in a variety of research contexts.
Skinner seems particularly interested in laboratory studies
of behavior and the methods of science appropriate to laboratory
investigations.

This is because such methods result in precise

control over the behavior of the researcher:
The experimental method includes the use of instruments
which improve our contact with behavior and with the
variables of which it is a function. Recording devices
enable us to observe behavior over long periods of time,
and accurate recording and measurement make-effective
quantitative analysis possible. The most important
feature of the laboratory method is the deliberate
manipulation of variables: the importance of a given
condition is determined by changing it in a controlled
fashion and observing the result.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 37)
Much of Skinner's professional activity, particularly in the
field of verbal behavior, has been of another sort, which he calls
"interpretation."

In Verbal Behavior he describes this activity

as follows:
One important feature of the analysis is that it
is directed to the behavior of the individual speaker
and listener; no appeal is made to statistical concepts
based upon data derived from groups. Even with respect
to the individual speaker or listener, little use is made
of specific experimental results. The basic facts to be
analyzed are well known to every educated person and do
not need to be substantiated statistically or experi
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mentally at the level of rigor here attempted. No
effort has been made to survey the relevant "literature."
The emphasis is upon an orderly arrangement of well-known
facts, in accordance with a formulation of.behavior
derived from an experimental analysis of a more rigorous
sort. The present extension to verbal behavior is thus
an exercise in interpretation rather than a quantitative
extrapolation of rigorous experimental results.
(Skinner,
1957, p. 11)
"Interpretive" verbal behavior serves a particular function
in the scientific community, as the results of Skinner's interpre
tive verbal behavior in Verbal Behavior on the discriminative
behavior of the careful reader may indicate.

Particularly, the

discriminative behavior involved in interpretation may be concep
tualized as useful when verbal behavior under the control of specific
experimental findings relative to a particular phenomenon or area
of interest is unavailable, or when a more general effect on a
listener or reader is required.

Skinner discusses the value of this

type of activity in About Behaviorism and he notes that interpretive
behavior is particularly useful when the individual doing the
"interpreting" has a certain type of history with respect to seeing
behavior in terms of functional relationships:
Obviously, we cannot predict or control human
behavior in daily life with the precision obtained in the
laboratory, but we can nevertheless use results from the
laboratory to interpret behavior elsewhere.
Such an
interpretation of human behavior in daily life has been
criticized as metascience, but all the sciences resort
to something much like it___
Those who argue that laboratory results cannot
account for human behavior in the world at large presum
ably believe that they know what is happening in that
world, or at least that it can be known. They are often
speaking of casual impressions. But if a statement about
behavior is less to be trusted in daily life than in a
laboratory setting, we must certainly ask whether the
impression against which it is compared is any more
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reliable. Those who feel that they understand what is
happening in the world at large may be tested in a very
simple way: let them look at the organism as it behaves
in a modern experiment and tell us what they see. The
contingencies currently under investigation, though
extremely complex, are far less complex than those in
daily life, yet it is almost impossible to discover what
is going on. Those familiar with laboratory research
will be more likely to look for the important things
and will know what other things to ask about; they will
have a better understanding of what they see. That is
why they can more accurately interpret daily life.
The laboratory analysis makes it possible to identify
relevant variables and to disregard others which, though
possibly more fascinating, nevertheless have little or
no bearing on the behavior under observation. Many of
the technological advances derived from the study of
operant behavior have had the benefit of that kind of
interpretation.
(Skinner, 1974, pp. 228-229)
What Skinner is pointing to in the above discussion is that a
history of exposure to certain kinds of contingencies results in
a pattern of responding to important functional relationships
between behavior and its environmental context.

This occurs

explicitly in laboratory research, where the methods involved and
the contingencies created by the research environment shape dis
criminative behavior in the researcher to factors which operate in
the control of the behavior under investigation.

It also may occur

in other settings, where the control over the researcher's behavior
is not so explicitly defined, but where certain historical contin
gencies enable similar kinds of discriminative responding on the
part of an observer to take place.
There are many kinds of scientific activity, ranging from
"interpretation" to "experimental" research, which provide useful
information about behavior.

It appears that discriminative behavior

on the order of interpretation may occur particularly in areas which
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have not been subjected to a more controlled and precise experimental
analysis.

Such is the case at the present time in the area of

verbal behavior, although empirical investigations are beginning to
be done.

In addition, behavior as it occurs "in daily life" is

often precisely the phenomenon some researchers are interested in
looking at.

A conceptualization of scientific knowledge as

discriminative behavior which has certain practical and profession
ally valued effects, and a realization that such behavior occurs
in a variety of contexts, offer a way to look at research practice,
not in terms of the specific research design used, but in terms
of the historical and contextual variables which are relevant to
the particular discriminations the investigator makes.
The identification of controlling contingencies, which is
the goal of a behavioral analysis, may occur in various contexts,
depending on the degree of research control involved and the
specificity of the phenomenon observed.

The relevance of a

radical behaviorist epistemology to this point is that, as behavior
is observed, be it in a controlled laboratory setting or in a
"real-life" situation, the discriminative responses of the researcher
are of the same kind to the extent that they are the result of
contingencies which shape discriminative behavior to the phenom
ena at hand.
The next chapter will look at two examples of empirical
research of verbal behavior.

They differ in terms of (1) the

setting in which the verbal behavior was generated,

(2) the degree

of control used, and (3) the kinds of discriminative behavior
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which the research situations evoked in the researchers.

They

are similar in that (1) the researchers were interested in doing
empirical work tied to a contingency analysis of verbal behavior,
and (2) the researchers had similar histories with respect to
contact with Skinner's work, including Verbal Behavior.

I will be

interested in outlining and discussing the methods used in the
light of the present conceptual approach in order to present
concrete examples of how empirical work in the analysis of verbal
behavior may take place.

In addition, an understanding of the

research presented seems to me to depend on a grasp of radical
behaviorist epistemology of the kind presented here.
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CHAPTER III
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH

The function of the present chapter is to present examples of
research on verbal behavior in such a way as to illustrate the
relationship between such research and epistemological considerations.
In order to do this, I will summarize two research studies on verbal
behavior recently carried out by graduate students in the Radical
Behaviorism program at the University of Nevada, Reno.

These

research studies have involved efforts on the part of the researchers
to develop methods which are appropriate to the study of "reallife" verbal behavior (on-going verbal behavior in situ) and which
allow relevant discriminations to be made concerning the verbal
phenomena observed.

I will describe the methods used in each study

in order to give the reader some idea of the ways in which two
individuals interested in doing functional analyses of verbal
behavior in situ have approached the problem.

In order to clarify

the methods used, I will attempt to describe what the researcher
did in conducting his or her research.

I will also be interested

in looking at the kinds of discriminations the researchers made
concerning the phenomena observed.

To do this, I will attempt to

describe not only the methods used (the research behavior) but also
the factors in the research situations which allowed the researchers
to respond discriminatively to relationships operating in the
control of verbal behavior.
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The studies to be presented here have evolved as the result
of much exposure to Skinner’s work, particularly Verbal Behavior.
Many of the particular moves made b y .the researchers are directly
influenced by Skinner's conceptual and epistemological verbal
behavior.

One of the studies shares particular characteristics

with traditional research approaches in the experimental and
applied analyses of behavior.

In the other, the reader may find

the approach taken unfamiliar or "non-'experimental" in nature.
Both examples of research, however, appear to me to engage a
consideration of Skinner's epistemological position, at least as it
has influenced the research behavior of the individuals concerned.
The emphasis here will be on the discriminative behavior of the
researchers and certain contingencies or factors operating in the
research situations, as well as in the histories of the researchers,
which enabled relevant discriminations to be made-

RESEARCH EXAMPLE I
The first example of research to be discussed is entitled
"An Exploratory Functional Analysis of Stimulus Control in
Descriptive Verbal Behavior."

This piece of research.was performed

at the University of Nevada, Reno by Brian Lahren for his doctoral
dissertation.

In his research, Lahren was interested in providing:

— an example of methodological research the goal of
which is the discovery of an analytic technique which
minimizes researcher interference with behavior in
progress.
Secondly, it is research which attempts to
discover what Skinner has called controlling functional
relations (cf. 1969, p. 7). The method involves preser
ving a real-time based picture of the stimulus context
in which descriptive talk occurred.
(Lahren, 1978, p. 4)
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Lahren was thus interested in looking at descriptive verbal
behavior as it occurs in circumstances similar to those in which
such talk generally occurs within our verbal community-

This

interest is not unrelated to the importance of descriptive verbal
behavior as it functions in science (see Lahren, 1978, p. 237).
Furthermore, he was attempting to devise a method whereby important
controlling relationships between descriptive verbal behavior and
the stimulus conditions of its occurrence could be "seen," or
responded to discriminatively by a researcher:
The central methodological concern in the design of the
present research was the protection and preservation of
a detailed picture of descriptive talk in its original
context of occurrence.
(p. 238)
Lahren's research is particularly interesting because it
focuses on finding controlling relations between verbal behavior
and its immediate context rather than emphasizing behavior-consequence relationships.

With this focus, Lahren's work canibe
t

considered as somewhat pioneering in the field of the analysis of
verbal behavior.

More important to the purposes of this paper,

however, is the opportunity the research report provides in illus
trating the way in which one particular researcher set about to
create a research procedure whereby controlling relationships
between on-going verbal behavior and its context of occurrence
could be seen and described or depicted by the researcher.

In my

discussion of Lahren's research, therefore, I will be focusing on
what Lahren did in (1) generating on-going descriptive verbal
behavior, and in (2) developing methods whereby controlling
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relations could be discriminated.

I will also be emphasizing the

relationship between Lahren's procedures and his subsequent discrim
inations of stimulus control; that is, I will look at the factors
in the research procedure which seemed to control his behavior in
identifying behavior-environment relationships.

The Data
Influenced by Skinner's early research on animal behavior, which
is reviewed in the introductory chapter of the disseration, and by
a concern with observing response consistencies to the same stimulus
events, Lahren devised a method whereby descriptive verbal behavior
could be generated to the same stimulus events in repeated sessions.
His data consisted of verbal descriptions of a short film which was
presented 13 times to four subjects.

The film was a 4-minute and

25-second segment of Herrnstein and Morse's "Changing Behavior
Through Reinforcement," which showed a pigeon responding under
four different schedules of reinforcement.

Lahren approximated a

baseline-manipulation-baseline design by splicing the film into
four segments and changing the order of presentation in Sessions 6,
7, and 8.

The subjects, college students,

were alone in a room

while observing the film and were instructed to describe the events
in the film in a way "natural" for them.

Their verbal behavior was

recorded for subsequent analysis. Thus, the data consisted of 13
tape recordings of descriptive verbal behavior to the same stimulus
events for each of the four subjects.
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The Analysis

Construction of "real-time" transcripts of verbal behavior

In order to compare verbal behavior across sessions, the
researcher instructed the subjects to indicate when the film began
in such a way as it could be picked up by the tape recorder.

In

this way, the researcher could construct what he called "real-time"
transcripts of the verbal behavior, which could then be compared
to events on the film as they occurred.

This was accomplished by:

(1) recording on the tapes, beginning with the "start" indicator,
a sound which marked off 1-second time intervals,

(2) transcribing

the verbal behavior on the tapes and noting where the 1-second
markers occurred in relation to the verbal behavior on the transcript,
and (3) constructing a "real-time" transcript which depicted the
verbal behavior of each subject as it occurred within each 1-second
time interval.

A sample of this "real-time" transcript is

presented below:
Real-Time Transcript:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

Subject 004, Session 1

OK, the film's on now
there's a pigeon
moving his head
back and forth

his wings are up
in the air flapping
he's turning
around

12:
13:

there's a
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14
15
16
17
18
19

looks like he's
the pigeon's in some
kind of box— going
over and he pecked the

20

and now he's eating
(Lahren, 1978, p. 147)

It is interesting to note that originally the researcher divided
the verbal behavior into 5-second intervals, but that the use of the
longer interval was abandoned because it was felt that a more
detailed picture of the verbal responses in relation to the stimulus
events in the film was needed for precise relationships to be found.
In essence, the 5-second intervals did not provide for sufficient
differential control over the researcher's behavior in analyzing
the data.
In this initial part of the analysis, then, the researcher
responded to the data with verbal behavior which both recorded the
data in visual form and also preserved a picture of the verbal
behavior in the data as it occurred through time.

Grouping response classes
The next part of the analysis involved finding groups of
responses (response classes) which could then be looked at to
determine any similarity in functional control.

To do this, Lahren

inspected the "real-time" transcripts across sessions for pieces of
verbal behavior which (1) occurred at similar points in time
(presumably in the presence of the same stimulus conditions on the
film) and which (2) appeared to be meaningfully related to each
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other.

He says:

Looking down the transcript for any session one can see
repeated references to "pecking," to a "light," to the
pigeon "eating," or "getting food," etc. Secondly, look
ing across all 10 baseline sessions it is apparent that
similarly meaningful responses occur at similar points
in time. These meaningfully similar responses are often
quite dissimilar in form.
Fortunately, human beings are equipped by their
verbal communities to respond to topographically dis
similar verbal responses with judgments as to their
equivalence of meaning— although the problem of just
what meaning is or how it functions is a topic for
considerable debate
(p. 152)
The observation that there are collections of responses
which appear similar in meaning provides a clue to the
identification of functional relations in verbal behavior.
When similarities of meaning are identified in a
collection of responses, the researcher should search
those situations in which the similar responses occurred
for common independent variables— for example, for shared
stimulus control.
(p. 153)
Lahren also repositioned the verbal behavior in Sessions 6, 7,
and 8, in which the film segments were shown in different orders
than in the rest of the sessions, enabling a comparison of the
verbal behavior in these sessions to "baseline" sessions.

This

allowed him to identify functionally equivalent responses across
all sessions.

In his report, Lahren presented two examples of

a response class for two subjects— showing those responses which
occurred within a narrow time band (presumably to the same events
on the film) across the sessions and which displayed how the
"meaningfulness criterion" was employed.

An example of such

responses is given below:
Response
Session in which
Item: Subject 002__________________ response occurred
nothing appears to be happening
and there seems to be no food

1
2
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no food
no food is coming down
he's not rewarded
nothing’s happening
he's getting no response
nothing's happening, the light is on
he's not receiving food
but the light is not...
and no response
light stays on

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12, 13

(pp. 160-161)
As a result of this procedure, Lahren concluded:
meaningfully equivalent verbal responses occur in
Sessions 6, 7, and 8 at points predictable from knowing
when similar responses had occurred in baseline conditions.
This is direct evidence that stimulus control is a
significant determinant of the occurrence of "meaning
fully" equivalent forms of response in descriptive
verbal behavior. On the basis of this functional
evidence one may presume that what have been identified
in these tables are classes of responses.
(p. 163)
In summary, in identifying classes of responses, Lahren
observed verbal behavior which occurred at similar points in time
in relation to the film and which occurred fairly consistently
across sessions.

He then made a determination of which responses

seemed to be meaningfully related. In doing so, Lahren

was focusing

on the effects the verbal responses had on him as a reader.
of "meaningfully related"

responses were based upon the

Judgments

fact that

such responses had similar effects on him such that Lahren was
led to consider them as members of a response class.

Defining stimulus properties which controlled descriptive verbal
behavior
So far, Lahren had a tentative identification of response
classes based on their time of occurrence and their similarity of
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meaning (shared effects on him).

He was concerned, however, with

the problem of discovering what stimulus properties in the film
seemed to control the occurrence of members of a class.

He was

also concerned with maintaining a truly functional definition of
verbal behavior; that is, classes of verbal behavior are to be
discovered by looking for similarities in the variables controlling
members of a class.

This is similar to Skinner's (1957) categori

zation of "mands," "tacts," etc., in which verbal behavior was
grouped according to functional relationships which could be seen
to apply.

In the next part of his analysis, Lahren set out to

"capture" the stimulus events in the film which might then be
related to the data as instances of stimulus control.
To achieve a description of the film's stimulus properties,
Lahren:
sat before Qthe filnQ...and began a process of stop
watch timing and recording .the temporal location and
duration of every discernable event in the stimulus
film. For each stimulus event that was identified a
start and stop point would be marked on a blank real-time
verbal transcript form and a simple verbal description
of that event written in the right margin opposite the
appropriate time marks,
(p. 171)
Lahren then devised identifiable marks or symbols which represented
the different occurrences of stimulus events that he had identified
on the film and transferred these "stimulus displays" onto plastic
transparencies.

These transparencies were superimposed on the

verbal transcripts so that the researcher's stimulus representations
and the subjects' verbal responses coincided visually.

In this way,

occurrences of previously identified- members of a response class
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could be located and their relation to similar stimulus events as
represented on the transparencies could be observed.
As a result of this procedure the researcher was able to
locate the exact occurrence of response class members, relative to
the point at which a specific stimulus event was present in the
film, across all sessions.

This allowed a picture of the varia

bility of the time at which the response occurred, given the same
stimulus event.

He was also able to eliminate a response from a

response class if its occurrence did not coincide with the presence
of the stimulus event seen by the researcher to be "controlling"
other members of the class.
One example of this procedure, of identifying stimulus and
response relationships, will be described briefly.

Lahren had

identified a class of verbal responses he called "peck" responses.
The verbal responses in this class would be meaningfully similar to
a subject saying "the pigeon pecked the key."

For example, the

following verbal responses occurred at approximately the same time
(seconds 31-34) for one subject: "the

pigeon pecked it" (Session

1); "the pigeon now looks up, pecks the light" (Session 2); "he's
pecking"

(Session 3); "he pecked at it" (Session 4); "he pecks at

the light" (Session 5); "he went over the give [sic]it an inquisi
tive peck"

(Session 6), etc.

When Lahren combined stimulus displays and the verbal tran
scripts, he could then note where, in relation to the stimulus
display, the members of the class "peck" had occurred.

One result

of this combination of stimulus display and verbal behavior, for the
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class already mentioned, is presented below.

The stimulus symbol

for the event of the pigeon pecking is a horizontal line, which
occurs below between seconds 31 and 32.

The graph on the right

of the display shows where, in relation to the peck on the film, a
member of the verbal class "peck” occurred in each session.
Subj ect 002

Sessions
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13

30:------------

31

32
33
34
35
36

In this way, Lahren was able to identify classes of verbal responses
in such a way as to directly relate their occurrence to identifiable
events in the stimulus film.
One aspect of Lahren's procedure for identifying stimulus
properties in the film, which could then be related to the
occurrence of verbal responses as instances of stimulus control,
deserves further comment.

In constructing his stimulus displays,

Lahren was behaving much as his subjects had; that is, he attempted
to describe events in the film as they actually occurred.

The

difference was in the additional controls over Lahren's behavior
in devising his description (i.e., the use of the stop-watch, the
ability to start and stop the film at will, etc.) which allowed a
more detailed verbal account (more discriminations could be made).
Also, by the time Lahren constructed the displays, he was extremely
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familiar with the aspects of the film his subjects had responded to
(the salient or important features to look for) by having had
repeated exposure to both the film and the verbal behavior in his
data.

His procedure shares certain features with research in the

applied analysis of behavior in which behavior and environmental
events are coded, or otherwise verbally represented, and conclu
sions about controlling relationships are drawn from the coded
data (e.g., Patterson, 1974).
present case,

The differences are that, in the

(1) the verbal behavior was transcribed from tape

recordings which allowed a preservation of most of its original
characteristics, and (2) Lahren’s verbal description was limited
perhaps only by his ability to discriminate an event's occurrence
and the salience of the event in its relationship to the verbal
behavior in his data.

The central importance of the researcher's

abilities to respond discriminatively is evident.

Locating stimulus-response relationships for one subject
One of Lahren's subjects (001) produced verbal behavior
which was sufficiently different in style from that of the other
subjects that Lahren singled it out for separate analysis.
differences in this sample of verbal behavior included:
frequent and lengthy periods of pausing,

The

(1) more

(2) rapid responding when

verbal behavior did occur, and (3) the impression from listening
to the tapes that the subject
208).

was nervous (see Lahren, pp. 207-

Also, Lahren noted:
In addition to the differences in pausing there
was a difference in the verbal behavior itself. Rather
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than the typical response pattern witnessed in the pre
ceding section this subject frequently responded with what
seemed to be a more interpretive style involving the
employment of "psychological" terms. For example, ^OOlJ
would watch the film for 16 to 35 seconds and then report
that the bird was "confused" or that "he makes a
distinction between the black and white light" or that
the bird "is unaware of anything in his present environ
ment." Responses containing the same "interpretation"
were often seen to occur over a slightly more encompas
sing time-band than was characteristic of the controlled
responses of the other subjects.
(pp. 209-210)
Lahren observed several examples of this subject's verbal
behavior which occurred at the same time a series of pecks could
be observed on the film.

While the verbal responses were formally

dissimilar in some ways (i.e., "now he becomes more interested in
the white light as he pecks it more times"
pecks it his curiosity is aroused highly"

(Session 6), "as he
(Session 7), "now he

seems to be getting a little bit annoyed at the white light"
(Session 11), Lahren was able to identify a response class, which
included members such as "aggravated," "annoyed," and "aroused,"
that seemed to be under the control of repeated instances of
pecking in the film.
Because the verbal responses of Subject 001 occurred less
frequently than the other subjects', Lahren picked a tentative
response class ("curiosity," "curiosity's sake") and examined
what stimulus events preceded its occurrence regardless of where
the responses occurred on the transcript.

He says:

If, due to low response rates, it is not possible
to scan across a given time location for all sessions
and locate similar responses, then response similarities
can be noted wherever they occur and their immediately
preceding stimulus events scanned for matching stimuli.
(p. 213)
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As a result of doing this for Subject 001's "curiosity” responses,
Lahren was able to observe that such responses followed events in
the film in which the pigeon, after paying no attention to the key
for a period of time, then returned to the key (during FI and mixed
FR-FI schedule segments of the film).

Lahren was thus able to

discriminate a fairly complex relation between the verbal behavior
of the subject and a property of the stimulus conditions under
which it occurred.

Presentation of debriefing protocols

Next, Lahren presented the transcripts of his "debriefing"
sessions with the subjects which occurred after their participation

in the research project was completed.

His main purpose in

including the transcripts, or "protocols," was to show that,
according to the subjects, they had not consciously tried to say

the same things at the same times in each session.

Also, the

protocols provided further evidence, from the subjects' verbal
behavior in discussing what they did, that confirmed rome of the
researcher's judgments about their verbal behavior in the sessions.
For example, Lahren made an assessment that Subject 001's verbal
responding manifested his nervousness in the experimental setting
and that he seemed to be composing verbal responses to the film
and then "blurting" them out (p. 208).

According to Subject 001's

protocol, he said:
And I think the first thing when I saw it myself it was
hard to sit down and say what was going on. Because
I was thinking in terms of what I_ was supposed to be
saying and what you want to hear, and what's actually
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happening with the bird, you know? And I think the first
couple of times it was hard, for me anyway, cause I didn't
know exactly what to say.
(p. 223)
Lahren presented the protocols, then, to function as further
evidence, or additional sources of control over the behavior of the
reader, and they may have functioned similarly for him as a
researcher.

He says:

the subject is literally sharing with us the events
which were the stimulus conditions for particular
aspects of his responding.
The information in these
protocols supports the analysis of control presented
in the preceding section and offers nothing which would
undermine a stimulus control account of the occurrence
of the response groups presented in this chapter.
(pp. 223-224)
It is interesting to note here that Lahren responded to the
verbal behavior of his subjects in the debriefing sessions as
functioning to identify sources of control over the verbal behavior
in the sessions.

What this means is that aspects of the subjects'

verbal behavior in the protocols had a similar effect on Lahren
as had aspects of his own previous responding in making assessments
of controlling relations.

The subjects' verbal behavior in the

protocols added an additional source of control over Lahren's
"judgments" and thus functioned to "confirm" or strengthen certain
discriminations previously made.

Because of this effect on him,

Lahren was led to say that the subjects had identified sources of
control over their own responding.

One-year follow-up
The final part of the researcher's analysis of his data
involved looking at similar transcripts of two subjects' verbal
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descriptions of the film 14 months after their initial participation
in the study.

The follow-up data were obtained in the same way as

originally, and the verbal behavior obtained was compared to the
previous data.

Lahren reports:

The results produced by this session are quite
interesting in that the behavior of each subject is
virtually identical with that in the earlier sessions.
(p. 224)
Lahren then demonstrated the similarity by showing where followup "peck" responses occurred in relation to his previous data for
one subject.

He concluded:

The most interesting outcome of the follow-up
procedure is the revelation of the incredible stability
of descriptive response patterns.
It is apparent for
both of these subjects that their characteristic response
pacing, phrasing, the grammatical frameworks employed,
and the events which control responding are so well
established as to allow very little variation in what
they will say or when they will say it even with the
passage of over a year's time.
(p. 223)

In summary, the methods which Lahren developed to demonstrate
stimulus control over descriptive verbal behavior involved (1)
generating descriptive verbal behavior to the same stimulus
conditions several times,

(2) ordering the verbal data as they

occurred in time so that comparisons across sessions could be
made,

(3) tentatively identifying response classes (verbal behavior

under similar functional control) according to (a) where the verbal
behavior occurred in the sessions and (b) whether or not the
responses seemed meaningfully related,

(4) creating a display of

the stimulus events as they occurred in time,

(5) finding corres

pondences between stimulus events and instances of a response
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class, and (6) comparing the verbal responses to responses recorded
more than one year later in the same circumstances.

As a result of

behaving in the above ways,. Lahren concluded:
Obviously the design features of this research do
allow at least a gross identification of the experi
mental variables controlling the occurrence of verbal
responding and the identification of the controlled
features of the response class. However, the data so far
presented constitute only a first step in the development
of a systematic experimental study of the stimulus control
relations in verbal behavior. What has been presented
offers little more than the "orderly arrangement of well
known facts" (1957, p. 11) which Skinner advocated
in the first chapter of Verbal Behavior. What is most
promising at present is that following the advice
contained in Verbal Behavior, it has been possible
to design a procedure which directly reveals an aspect
of stimulus control that occurs in verbal behavior.
(pp. 235-236)

Controlling Factors
Mention has already been made of some of the ways in which
the procedures in Lahren's study "engaged" or controlled his
discriminations of stimulus-response relationships.

Here I will

briefly describe what I take to be some major factors controlling
Lahren's behavior in his research.

First, I will examine some

conceptual issues which appeared to control his behavior in
designing the experiment as he did.

These issues are actually

factors in the researcher's history (and elements or characteris
tics of his verbal behavior in discussing his research) which
appeared to.me to have played a part in the control over his
general research behavior.

Secondly, I will attempt to make clear

how Lahren's research behavior, in the organization of the data,
produced further controls over his ability to "see" functional
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relationships.

Finally, I will briefly discuss certain epistemolog-

ical issues which the procedures engage.
Lahren's research is distinguished by the fact that he attempt
ed to create a situation in which "response consistencies" in
verbal behavior could be observed.

This attempt appears to be

tied to several factors in his professional history:

(1) Lahren's

familiarity with Skinner's early operant research on animal
behavior in which Skinner developed his interest in rate as a
datum providing an opportunity for a researcher to evaluate
functional relations,

(2) Lahren's familiarity with baseline-

manipulation-baseline designs in the experimental and applied
analyses of behavior, and (3) Lahren's exposure to Skinner's (1957)
prescription for scientific analysis to involve (a) "simple
description" of the phenomena of interest and (b) the "explanation"
of behavior in terms of its relationship to other variables
(see Skinner, 1957, p. 10), and the fact that descriptive verbal
behavior (as in "tacts") has a fairly straightforward controlling
relationship to its immediate context of occurrence.

I believe all

these conceptual considerations played a part in Lahren's behavior
in designing his research.
In terms of Lahren's behavior in carrying out his analysis,
several things can be said.

Once Lahren had generated his time-

based transcripts, the problem of identifying response classes
became a matter of "simple looking” at the verbal responses across
the sessions, much as a researcher observes response patterns on
a cumulative record.

The verbal behavior of the subjects, ordered
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according to time of occurrence in relation to the stimulus film,
came to control Lahren's behavior in making judgments of "meaningful
units.

The main point here is that the records of Lahren *s

behavior in creating the time-ordered transcripts produced a
situation in which certain aspects of the responding of the subjects
could come to directly control further behavior on Lahren's part.
It should also be clear that the stimulus displays Lahren
constructed were responses to the film events as they occurred.
Lahren put himself in a situation in which his own discriminative
responding could be controlled, as much as posible, by the events
on the film.
The stimulus displays themselves provided an additional source
of control over Lahren's initial discriminations of response classes
By observing the relationship of his subjects' verbal responses to
his own constructed stimulus displays, Lahren was able to confirm
(or reject) his tentative identifications of response class
members.

He was also able to compare responses which occurred at

different times in the transcripts, and which seemed to be
"meaningfully" related, by noting similarities in the relationship
of such responses to events on the. stimulus displays (i.e., Subject
001's responses to repeated instances of pecking).
Finally, the subjects' verbal behavior in the debriefing
protocols offered an additional source of control over certain of
Lahren's discriminations of factors controlling the subjects'
verbal behavior.
The procedures Lahren developed for the analysis of descrip
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tive verbal behavior thus functioned, as was discussed in Chapter
I, to bring the researcher's discriminative responding under more
precise control of important characteristics of the data.

They

also functioned to strengthen or confirm initial discriminations
which were made.

This study, then, illustrates certain episte-

mological issues relevant to research; that is, new "knowledge"
is gained by the shaping of relevant discriminations to a particu
lar phenomenon of interest.

It also illustrates how verbal behavior

on the researcher's part is able to help shape similar discrimina
tions in a reader (i.e., the present writer).

RESEARCH EXAMPLE II
A conspicuous example of research based upon a Skinnerian
epistemological position is found in Marguerite McCorkle's (1978)
doctoral dissertation entitled "A Radical Behaviorist Study of
'Women's Experience of Conflict'."

McCorkle's disseration incor

porates an unconventional approach to psychological research,
largely because McCorkle conceptualized her research not just as
a study of interesting verbal behavior but also as an opportunity
to observe and attempt to describe her own behavior as a researcher
engaged in looking at verbal behavior.

While her dissertation is

clinical in focus and interest, McCorkle relies heavily on the
conceptual work of Skinner in order to present and make sense of
what she does.
Perhaps the best way to introduce McCorkle's study is to
offer an example of her own verbal behavior in presenting her
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research position:
The main purpose in undertaking this project has
been to develop and articulate a radical behaviorist
perspective (or "theoretical rationale"), and to main
tain this alternative point of view while beginning a
long-range program of research dealing with a problem
of considerable professional interest, namely, "women's
experience of conflict." While this approach will be
discussed throughout the following pages, it can generally
be set apart from other psychological orientations by
(1) its opposition to mentalistic explanation, and (2)
its fundamental reliance on a conceptual framework which
emphasizes the analysis of contingencies of reinforce
ment. This approach directs attention towards behavior,
and in particular to the relation of behavior to ante
cedent stimulus conditions and reinforcing consequences.
This fundamental conceptual framework also provides a
basis for considering the theoretical foundations of
scientific research. The reader will be asked to read
about the behavior of a researcher as this behavior
actually occurs in the conduct of a sample of preliminary
scientific research.
In this, the emphasis will not be
so much on the nature of the practices themselves as
upon the way in which these practices engage the behavior
of the researcher.
(McCorkle, 1978, pp. 3-4)
McCorkle's dissertation, taken as a whole, offers an interest
ing opportunity for a reader to see how certain conceptual and
analytical approaches influenced one individual’s behavior in
carrying out, reporting, and putting into a professional context a
piece of research on verbal behavior.

Specifically, as can be seen

in the above quotation, McCorkle aligned herself with the conceptual
approach of radical behaviorism.

However, this identification with

radical behaviorism, particularly with respect to Skinner's epistemological position, led McCorkle to make some moves which are
different than those commonly encountered within the behaviorist
literature,

in approaching her research as a radical behaviorist,

McCorkle felt called upon to (1) put her understanding of radical
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behaviorism into a professional context which included certain
conceptual approaches and practices outside of a strictly behaviorist
tradition,

(2) focus attention on her own behavior as a researcher

interested in the analysis of verbal behavior, and (3) structure
her research report in such a way that her verbal behavior therein
functioned to shape particular discriminations in the reader.

I

will be describing here some of the ways in which McCorkle approached
these areas in her dissertation.

Consideration of Other Conceptual Approaches
In introducing her research, and in creating a context from
which certain conceptual issues relevant to her research approach
could be viewed, McCorkle presented extensive discussion and
material regarding conceptual orientations which she felt shared
certain characteristics with a radical behaviorist view.

These

discussions involved looking at the ways in which radical behaviorism
shares certain characteristics with (1) a "human science" approach
to psychological research,

(2) ethology,

(3) "naturalistic" research

approaches, and (4) phenomenological psychology.

In the following,

it is important to keep in mind that each of these areas of concern
were presented in order that the reader may more clearly respond
to particular aspects of a radical behaviorist approach to research
which McCorkle deemed important.

Human Science
Chapter I of McCorkle's disseration is entitled "The 'Human
Science' Tradition in Psychology."

In this chapter, McCorkle sets
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out to distinguish an approach to psychological research which is
different than that of the "natural-scientific" view commonly held
within the profession.

By "natural-scientific" McCorkle means the

methodology of the natural or physical sciences, which psychology
adopted in the late

1800's:

2

This methodology of the natural sciences was primarily
experimental, where laboratory conditions could be
controlled and systematically varied so that their effects
on another variable could be isolated and recorded....
Measurement and quantitative accounts were valued as
more precise and more objective, particularly because
repeated observations could than be made and results
compared, and thus accidental and private (i.e.,
investigator-influenced) factors affecting the results
could be ruled out. Questions were formulated in the
form of testable hypotheses, and the experimental
results were viewed as impersonal facts. By such
methods, the physical sciences had been able to dis
cover the "basic particles" of which wholes were composed
and were then able to formulate general laws in which
the interaction of the (supposedly) fundamental units
were related.
(pp. 10-11)
With such a characterization of the natural science view,
largely adopted by psychology as "methodological behaviorism"
(cf. p. 20), McCorkle contrasted the "human science" tradition.
To do this, McCorkle presented arguments against a natural-science
or methodological behaviorist approach to science by several
individuals, including Wilhelm Dilthey, Franz Brentano, William
James, Abraham Maslow, Amedeo Giorgi, B. F. Skinner, and Willard
Day.

While I will not discuss specifically McCorkle's presentation

of these arguments, I will offer a characterization of the human
science approach as McCorkle presented it.
A "human science" approach is concerned with approaching the
subject matter and methodology of psychology in ways which preserve
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the "human context."

McCorkle says:

[The human science tradition] insists that the subject
matter (or content) jof psychology]] include complex
activities and experiences of human beings as they live
their lives. Psychology should not limit itself to only
those elements which can comfortably be fitted into a
physical science paradigm, a practice which tends to
exclude the human context. A second point, which I
believe is also a part of the human science perspective,
is a perspective towards "science" in which it is
regarded essentially as a human activity (or behavioral
phenomenon). (pp. 18-19)
This concern with maintaining or preserving the "human context" of
psychological phenomena is seen by McCorkle as opposed to the
fundamentally reductionistic and structuralistic orientation of
mainstream psychology.
As McCorkle develops her characterization of "human science"
traditions in psychology, she touches on several aspects of that
approach which she sees as "compatible" with radical behaviorism.
Specifically, radical behaviorism is seen by McCorkle to be compat
ible with a human science orientation in the following ways:
(1) A human science position emphasizes description of human
experience rather than the construction of theories about human
functioning (pp. 32-33).

Radical behaviorism is also concerned with

opposing theory-construction, because it has led to mentalistic
accounts of human behavior.

Rather, behavior should be directly

observed and related to factors operating in its control.
(2) A human science position emphasizes the importance of
maintaining the human context of important human phenomena.

Radical

behaviorism is also interested in the context in which behavior
occurs.

It seeks to discover functional relations between behavior
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and its immediate and historical context (pp. 36-39).
(3)

A human science approach insists that the human qualities

of the researcher be taken into account.

Radical behaviorism

"accounts for the behavior of the researcher with the same paradigm
it uses to account for the behavior of the person being investigated"
(p. 39).
The human science approach is thus presented to highlight cer
tain issues in psychology which McCorkle wishes to stress as relevant
to her understanding of radical behaviorism.

McCorkle, in reviewing

the human science tradition in psychology, is interested in bringing
these issues to the attention of the reader in order that similar
characteristics of her radical behaviorist approach may be responded
to.

These issues are summarized at the end of Chapter I as follows:
First, the approach takes for its subject matter the
experience and behavior of the human person.
Rather
than seeking basic structural formulations, in a broad
sense this approach seeks explanation in terms of func
tional relations between the subject-phenomenon and its
human context (i.e., the environment as discriminated by
given persons). The approach assumes by its methods
the responsibility for empirical and detailed analysis
of the phenomenon in question, and while experiments may
be included as part of the method, the human science
approach is not committed to the natural science model
as it- is practiced. The traditional natural science view
of "objectivity" is reconceptualized, and therefore there
is a certain reflective quality in the methodology,
because the human qualities of the researcher need to be
accounted for. Science is regarded as no more than a
particular human activity, and as such its connection
to certain value-orientations should be recognized.
Since the human science approach tends to be concerned
with the analysis of fairly complex human experiences,
it should be recognized that the commitment is to the
investigation of such human activities, and not to a
particular methodology. Rather, appropriate methods
must be developed and empirically evaluated.
(pp. 41-42)
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Before moving on to a discussion of McCorkle’s treatment of
similarities between radical behaviorism and other research approaches
in psychology, I wish to briefly describe what McCorkle means when
she talks about a "radical behaviorist methodology."

In Chapter II

of her dissertation, entitled "A Rationale for a Radical Behaviorist
Methodology," McCorkle presents certain treatments by Skinner of
such concepts as "scientific knowledge," "the analysis of contin
gencies," "causation" and "control," and the role of the scientist
in research.

In doing so, it is interesting that McCorkle states

that, as yet, no clearly defined radical behaviorist methodology
exists (p. 43).

This is because, as McCorkle sees it, a radical

behaviorist methodology is concerned with the development of
procedures for the analysis of controlling contingencies, yet such
an analysis revolves centrally around the abilities of an observer
to respond discriminatively in certain ways under particular
conditions and is not necessarily tied to experimental procedures.
McCorkle states:
Unfortunately, there seems to be little professional,
intellectual concern with the problem of how a trained
observer is able to assess the contingencies governing
behavior which occurs in the laboratory or other con
trolled settings
What must be made evident, however,
is that the significant change in frequency of the target
behavior must be discriminated by someone, even if this
simply requires observing changes in the slope of a
cumulative record.
However, the move from the analysis of behavior in
an experimentally controlled environment to the analysis
of behavior in situ appears to generate conceptual
difficulty for the non-behaviorist and naive behaviorist
alike.
[cQne need not emphasize nor assume a significant
difference between a trained observer's capacity to
analyze contingencies in the two situations, although
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the difference in the observer's relevant reinforcement
history in the two situations is again pertinent. How
ever, one of the important issues which does arise con
cerns the greater difficulty in initially specifying the
antecedent stimulus control (S^'s) governing the obser
ver's assessment of the on-going stream of behavior in
situ. (pp. 51-52)
McCorkle is thus calling attention to the fact that, as a
radical behaviorist interested in the analysis of verbal behavior in
situ, there seems to be no professionally endorsed methodology for
her to follow, nor is she interested in approximating controlled
experimental procedures.

Rather, she is interested in relying on

her own discriminative capacities to be shaped by contact with the
phenomenon she observes.

Part of what McCorkle means by a

"radical behaviorist methodology," which again emphasizes this
point, is presented below:
A helpful rule might be that, whenever any kind of
behavioral phenomenon is placed for professional purposes
under direct observation, the next step must always be
simply to get the observer to talk under the control of
what has been observed, that is, to verbalize in record
able form whatever interesting new discriminations were
produced by the act of observation— .
Such a proposed research format, as an activity
or process, should be designed in such a way that the
researchers increasingly refine or sharpen their ability
to identify the stimuli to which they are actually
responding
From a radical behaviorist perspective,
we are interested in the researcher being able to provide
an initial description of the behavioral episode including
concurrent environmental conditions. However, given
such a methodology, we must also be prepared to make
additional discriminations concerning the differences
that exist between "description" and other classes of
verbal behavior, e.g., verbal behavior that appears
to be more intraverbally controlled. Much of the
writing of research reports can be expected to consist
of descriptions of behavior, descriptions of relevant
environmental context, and the simple verbal responding
to protocols by way of reporting discriminationsHowever, other relevant writing in the report may involve
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the verbal manipulations necessary to place the research
properly in its appropriate professional context, and
this is intraverbal behavior.
(pp. 55-57)
The material presented above is representative of the kinds
of discriminations McCorkle wishes her reader to make with respect
to her approach to research.

In developing her "rationale,”

McCorkle relies heavily on the work of Skinner and Day.

In

particular, she is concerned with shaping her reader's responses
with respect to (1) the role of the observer in any assessment of
behavior and its controlling relations,

(2) the need for the

development of procedures which shape interesting new discriminations
in the observer to the phenomenon observed,

(3) the central

importance of description in any attempt to assess behavior, and
(4) the behavior of the researcher in reporting these discriminations
and otherwise shaping the reader's responses.
With this brief background in McCorkle's approach to radical
behaviorist research, I now wish to discuss how McCorkle aligns
her approach with certain aspects of ethology, "naturalistic"
research, and phenomenological psychology.

This discussion occurs

in Chapter III of the disseration: "A Review of Similar Method
ologies. "

Ethology
In this section, McCorkle reviews what are the essential
features of the field of ethology as she sees than.

Included in

this discussion are such topics as the influences of Charles
Darwin, the procedures of the "comparative method" used by Lorenz
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and others in studying species-specific behavior and the conditions
under which such behavior occurs, and the use of evolutionary concepts
such as "selection pressure."

Ethology is seen to be similar to

radical behaviorism in the following ways:

(1) Both ethology and

radical behaviorism involve the use of Darwinian concepts;

(2) both

seek functional analyses of behavior in situ; (3) both are concerned
with the use of observation and description in their methods;

(4)

both are concerned with stimulus control over behavior.
McCorkle also outlines some major differences between the two
fields.

They include (1) the kinds of behaviors of interest

("instinctive" vs. "operant"),

(2) ethology's reliance on a

structuralistic morphology or categorization of behavior as opposed
to radical behaviorism's interest in strictly functional relations,
and (3) ethology's inclusion of certain mentalistic concepts to
explain behavior.

"Naturalistic" research
McCorkle, in this section, finds a similarity between radical
behaviorism and various "naturalistic" research approaches
primarily in the interest in observing behavior in situ and in the
assertion that there are certain limits to the predominant
experimentally-oriented approach to research.

However, she is

careful to point out that naturalistic research approaches ofteninvolve structuralistic and mentalistic aspects to which a radical
behaviorist would be opposed.
A major point made by McCorkle in this section involves the
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differences between the behavior a researcher engages in when
studying a phenomenon and the ways in which the researcher concep
tualizes or verbalizes what occurred in the research.

While

"naturalistic" research often involves the observation and descrip
tion of on-going human behavior in situ, the theoretical discussion
involved often calls upon concepts which the radical behaviorist
would not use, i.e., as in characterizing a piece of research as
"pre-theoretical" or "hypothesis-building" (cf. p. 89).

Phenomenological Psychology
Lastly in Chapter III, McCorkle discusses those aspects of
phenomenological psychology which she sees as relevant to her
radical behaviorist approach.

The "branch" of phenomenology she

presents is that of Amedeo Giorgi, whose philosophical orientation
comes from the influences of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Giorgi,

in his work, affirms a "human science" approach to psychological
investigation.

Also, he is:

concerned with the analysis of human experience and
behavior as it is experienced by the human person.
"The
real is to be described and not constructed" (Giorgi,
1970, pp. 138-139). Consequently, the methods are
designed so that the researcher remains "open" to the
emergence of the actual and by means of description tries
to capture the phenomenon as faithfully as possible....
Phenomenological descriptions of experience are
systematically condensed in order to provide an "essence"
of the structure of the phenomenon in question. The
"essence" is, as it is viewed from that perspective, the
researcher’s "subjective vision" of the phenomenon,
but it is presented in a form that can be shared.
(pp. 90-91)
McCorkle presents an example of the phenomenological method
in her discussion, which illustrates how "meaning units" are
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derived from a verbal protocol and how the researcher then constructs
a more condensed and general description of the phenomenon discussed
in the protocol.

She then delineates areas in which phenomenology

and radical behaviorism can be said to be similar in interest and
focus.

These include (1) an emphasis on descriptions based on

empirical investigation,

(2) a recognition of the role of the

observer's history as it influences the assessment,
for

(3) a concern

the context within which a behavior or experience occurs, and

(4) a concern with the analysis of verbal behavior.

She also

points out that phenomenology and radical behaviorism involve
different conceptual approaches and therefore phenomenological
descriptions are likely to involve both structuralistic explanations
and mentalistic accounts and do not emphasize the role of the
environment in contributing to controlling contingencies.

McCorkle's discussion of radical behaviorism's affinity to
other research approaches provides verbal stimuli which are
presented to shape certain discriminations in the reader.

These

discriminations have to do, in part, with important aspects of a
radical behaviorist approach to research.

As McCorkle summarizes:

M u
of these approaches can be viewed as similar in
that they move away from the dominant, methodologicallybehavioristic orientation of mainstream psychology.
The approaches were also similar in that most of them
proposed functional (or contextual) considerations of
their subject matter
(p. 99)
McCorkle's discussion in Chapter III is particularly inter
esting because she points to areas of similarity between radical
behaviorism and other approaches not commonly considered by the
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behaviorist community.

In this sense, she appears to be interested

in pointing to certain areas within the profession with which
radical behaviorists may be able to dialogue or find interests in
common, in spite of differences in conceptual systems (or verbal
communities).

An Example of Discrimination Training:
Theoretical vs. Descriptive Verbal Behavior
Chapter IV of McCorkle’s dissertation, entitled "An Intro
duction to Women's Issues," is designed to function in a particular
way for the specific purpose of shaping up one particular discrim
ination on the part of the reader.

In general, the chapter is used

to "introduce" the topic area of McCorkle's research:
experience of conflict."

"women's

More particularly, however, the chapter

is designed to establish a contrast between two types of verbal
behavior.

Verbal stimuli, moreover, are presented in a way

designed to produce a particular discrimination on the part of the
reader with respect to these two types of verbal behavior.

The

chapter also sets up the reader to respond appropriately to the
kind of verbal behavior McCorkle is interested in investigating
as a radical behaviorist.
In the first section of the chapter, McCorkle presents pro
fessional and "theoretical" discussions concerning women and
"psychological conflict."

The samples of the professional

literature represent Freudian, Marxist, and Jungian treatments of
the topic, all by prominent women in the fields concerned.

They

are, respectively, Juliet Mitchell (Psychoanalysis and Feminism,
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1974); Charnie Guettel (Marxism and Feminism, 1974); and M. Esther
Harding (The Way of All Women, 1970) .
In the second section of the chapter, McCorkle again presents
verbal behavior from literature which pertains to "women's
experience of conflict."

However, these selections are not taken

from the professional literature.

Instead, they are found in

writings by women who have, for one reason or another, wanted to
describe their own personal experience.

The verbal behavior con

cerned is taken from personal, autobiographical accounts of three
women:

Hannah Tillach, From Time to Time (1973); Anais Nin, The

Diary of Anais Nin (Vol. 1, 1931-1934); and Carolina Maria de Jesus
in Revelations:

Diaries of Women (1975).

Within the body of the chapter, McCorkle does very little
"discussion" concerning the content of the literature samples she
presents.

For the most part, her verbal behavior in the chapter

consists of simply presenting the material, as "samples of verbal
behavior"

(p. 127).

In order to illustrate the effect of the

presentation of these two types of verbal behavior on the reader,
I will reproduce here some brief excerpts from that verbal behavior
The following are samples from the first, or professional, type
of literature presented by McCorkle:
In both sexes, castration is the signal to give up
the mother— but for the boy only so that he should wait
for his turn and in good time get his own woman; for the
girl, acceptance of 'castration' indicates that she
should become like her mother. The overcoming of the
Oedipus complex of both is a sign to start identifying
finally with the parent of the same sex so that society
can go on accordingly. The confirmation of his first
love-object for the boy which is his Oedipus complex
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is renounced till he grows up like his father whom he
meanwhile internalizes as his superego by identification.
The contradiction of her first love-object for the girl,
which is her Oedipus complex, never really need be
renounced, for that is her feminine destiny.
(p. 105)
The main contradiction is not between men and women,
but between the forces of production, people's labour
power, machines, materials, etc., and the property
relations of production, the ownership of almost every
thing by a few capitalists who produce only for profit.
The struggle between the classes is an expression of this
contradiction. Capitalism tried to use reproduction,
sexuality, masculine-feminine socialization of children
in such a way as to make us more exploitable, not to
satisfy human needs. Herein lies the special oppression
of women as women, as well as of women as workers.
(p. 109)
But humanity at large has moved since those days toward
a greater consciousness, chiefly through the emergence
of a conscious and personal ego whose aims have conflicted
with the simple urges which Mother Nature first implanted
in our breasts. Thus, as woman has evolved and become
more aware of herself as a separate entity— an ego— a
conflict has arisen within her psyche between the indi
vidual values which she has attained and the ancient,
collective, feminine trends— and conflict is the beginning
of consciousness.
(p. 116)
What follows are samples of the verbal behavior taken from
the second, or "autobiographical," type of literature.

The three

samples presented below are from the writings of Hannah Tillach,
Ana’is Nin, and Carolina Maria de Jesus, in that order:
Now I am seeing the image of my first husband, the
one who had to propose to me three times, and even then
it was still wrong. I was a child-woman then, hiding
my intellect.
(This was before Heinrich had made me
aware of my own dignity.)
I pretended to be what my
first husband wanted me to be, the body beautiful. He
drew, painted, and worshipped me. For him, I was the
little woman; he pampered, spoiled, and ruled.
It was
by walking through the door of my intellect that I
left him.
(p. 121)
There are ideas which Dr. Allendy {[her psychoanalyst]
abandons. But every time he touches upon the theme of
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confidence, he sees the turmoil and distress I feel.
I lie back and I feel an inrush of pain, despair, defeat.
Dr. Allendy has hurt me.
I cry. I feel weak. It is time
to go. I stand up and face him. His marine-blue eyes
are very soft. He feels pity for me; he says, "You
have suffered a great deal." But I did not want pity;
I wanted him to admire me, to think me a unique woman.
(P- 124)
July 27
...Senhor Gino came to me to ask me to go to his
shack. That I am neglecting him. I answered; no!
I am writing a book to sell. I am hoping that
with this money I can buy a place and leave the favela.
I don't have time to go to anybody's house. Senhor
Gino insisted. He told me:
"Just knock and I'll open the door."
But my heart didn't ask me to go to his room.
(p. 126)
The discrimination to be made between the two approaches
should be fairly clear.

McCorkle is interested in a professional

concern and treatment of aspects of women's experience.

She is also

interested in ways in which this topic may be approached from a
radical behaviorist viewpoint.

While a typical professional move

might be to investigate or attempt to clarify or translate
theoretical conceptions related to the topic, it is apparent that
there is a wide discrepancy between the kinds of discriminations
which would be produced by contact with the two kinds of verbal
behavior presented.

The "professional" samples are clearly much

more intraverbally controlled.

The personal writings, on the

other hand, appear to "describe" or "get at" the kinds of
phenomena which women actually encounter in their lives.

It is

this second, "descriptive" quality of verbal behavior which
McCorkle regards as potentially more professionally informative
and useful.

She concludes;

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith out p e r m is s io n .

The second kind of literature reviewed was not "theoretical”
but rather can be considered as examples of the kind of
verbal behavior one might expect from a person trying to
describe their own experience. This literature should
at least support the notion that we, as professionals,
have much to learn from simply talking to people. In
other words, this literature supports the professional
move of asking women themselves about how they behave and
what they experience.
Research undertaken with this
approach in mind would produce a line of research
remarkably distinct from research which is designed to
test (the goodness of fit of) our theoretical models.
(p. 128)
^Emphasis added]

The Research Project:
"Women’s Experience of Conflict"
Given the preceding discussion of McCorkle's behavior in (1)
providing a professional context for her research approach, and
(2) providing for a particular discrimination in the reader to the
kind of verbal behavior she in interested in investigating as a
radical behaviorist, I wish now to consider how McCorkle approached
the problem of investigating "women's experience of conflict."
McCorkle's behavior in setting up and carrying out her research
project was primarily influenced by her interest in approaching
a research situation a£ ji radical behaviorist.

What this means

specifically is that, first, McCorkle wished to directly observe
a particular type of verbal behavior "descriptive" of "women's
experience of conflict."

She then wished to allow her contact with

the verbal behavior to shape whatever particular discriminations
occurred in her, and she wanted to be able to describe these dis
criminations in some way.

In addition, McCorkle wished to have

her own behavior in response to her data develop as a result of
her previous responding in the research situation, as opposed to
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following a prearranged research plan or method of analysis.

In

this way, McCorkle was interested in having her own behavior in
response to her data become increasingly more under the control of
important aspects of the verbal behavior in her data-

She was also

interested in letting her behavior be guided by the specific
contingencies which would emerge as a result of her interaction
with her data and her previous behavior in responding discriminatively
to her data.
The results of this process lend a different quality to
McCorkle's behavior than may be expected (i.e., by members of the
behaviorist community interested in learning something about the
functional analysis of verbal behavior).

While McCorkle is

interested in the functional analysis of verbal behavior, her
research did not have this as a specific goal.

Rather, she

attempted to enter a research situation, primarily guided by her
conceptual approach, to see what kinds of behavior might be
shaped, in her, as a result.

Her research is reported in Chapter

V of her dissertation, which is entitled "Demonstration Study."

The data
For the purposes of her research, McCorkle was interested in
gathering some "real-life" verbal behavior having to do with
"women’s experience of conflict."

To do this, she obtained the

cooperation of three adult women who participated with her in ten
weekly hour-long "Interview" sessions.

These sessions were tape-

recorded and observed behind a one-way mirror by another graduate
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student.

McCorkle’s behavior in the interview setting was designed

to produce a particular type of verbal interaction with the
participants.

Concerning the interview environment, McCorkle has

this to say:
In general, the research setting was intimate and
supportive. There was an attempt on the part of the
researcher to create an atmosphere that would occasion
a behavioral style for all participants that was
"spontaneous, open, and honest." The focus of the
interaction between the interviewer and the subjects
was to frankly discuss some of the difficulties they had
encountered in relation to their femaleness. Partici
pants were asked about topics that would usually be
considered "private" or "intimate," e.g., evaluating
interpersonal relationships.
(p. 135)
McCorkle, therefore, attempted to create a research environ
ment conducive to the generation of verbal behavior descriptive of
real issues the women participants had encountered in their lives.
Given this type of verbal behavior as her data (approximately 25
hours of tape-recorded material), McCorkle was not interested in
"proving" anything specific to "women's experience of conflict."
Rather, she was interested in bringing her own discriminative
behavior under the control of significant verbal behavior as it
occurs under particular circumstances— where individuals are
encouraged to "describe" their experience in a variety of ways—
and she was interested in letting her behavior "evolve" as a
result of the interaction

with her data.

McCorkle’s interest in allowing the research situation to
shape whatever discriminative responses would occur in her meant
that, unlike with much psychological research, McCorkle had few
"a priori"assumptions concerning how to respond to her data.
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this point she says:
... [jrjhe reader is reminded that the current methodologi
cal perspective proposes to allow the researcher, at least
in part, the opportunity to be "controlled by the data."
Even with respect to developing research procedures,
the researchers simply responded to the data at hand.
Consequently, the methods used in organizing these data
were not planned a priori, but instead they developed
as responses to the actual data.
(pp. 193-194)
Given a data-base of approximately 25 hours of taped verbal
behavior, McCorkle responded in several ways.

Her behavior in

response to her data can roughly be separated into (1) displaying
the data in order to bring the researcher or the reader into con
tact with the behavior observed, and (2) selecting verbal behavior
relevant to "women's experience of conflict."
outline how McCorkle responded to her data.

I will briefly
In doing so, I will

attempt to emphasize and describe the major discriminations
McCorkle made regarding her data in order that the reader may see
how the research process resulted in new discriminative behavior
on the researcher's part.

In the following discussion, it is

important to keep in mind that McCorkle was primarily involved in
her "demonstration study" in a particular way: to let her responses
to her data develop as a result of the contingencies which emerged
as the research situation progressed and as her behavior came
increasingly under the control of aspects of the verbal behavior
in her data.

Displaying the data
One of the first problems which McCorkle faced was that of
"capturing" or displaying the on-going verbal behavior on the tapes.
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She responded to this problem in two ways:

(1) she constructed

written transcripts of segments of the data, and (2) she devised
a "Catalogue" system which involved verbal descriptions of the
material on the tapes.
In her dissertation, McCorkle included a sample transcript of
one Interview session.

The transcript is lengthy (it comprises

approximately 40 pages of material) but McCorkle felt it was
important to include it "in order to bring the reader into contact
with the relevant behavior"

(p. 136).

The transcript does

illustrate the kind of verbal behavior of interest.

In it, the

participant describes certain aspects of a "conflict" situation
involved in making the decision to leave her husband.
In order to preserve aspects of her own responding to the
interaction in the Interview sessions, McCorkle engaged in what
she called "Debrief sessions."
after each interview.

These sessions occurred immediately

They were composed of discussion between

McCorkle and her assistant/observer concerning what had occurred
in the immediately preceding interview.

The verbal interaction

in the Debrief sessions was tape-recorded.

Specifically, the

Debrief sessions were designed to allow the researchers the
opportunity to record their responses to the stimuli in the
interview at a time when these responses would still be at some
strength.

The discriminative responses recorded would be,

presumably, maximally under the control of the immediately
preceding behavior which occurred in the interview session.
McCorkle says about the Debrief process:
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These sessions are viewed as having helped shape relevant
discriminations on the part of the researchers and as
in other ways having influenced their subsequent behavior.
(p. 181)
The dissertation includes a transcript of a Debrief session.
The presentation of this transcript was viewed by McCorkle as
serving a similar function as that of the first; that is, the
transcript was presented as an example of the verbal behavior
of the researchers as it actually occurred.

The transcript is

particularly interesting in that it illustrates the kinds of
discriminative responses on the part of the researcher and her
assistant which occurred in response to the interaction of a
particular interview session.
It should also be noted that the presentations of the Inter
view and Debrief transcripts in the dissertation function to expose
the reader to a sample of the original verbal behavior and that
such an exposure brings the reader under the control of conditions
similar to those operating in the research situation.

McCorkle

relies on the presentation of transcripts to shape certain dis
criminations in the reader regarding (1) the kind of verbal
behavior women engage in when asked to talk about conflict
situations in their lives, and (2) the types of verbal behavior
the researchers engaged in when responding discriminatively to
aspects of that verbal behavior.
After the data had been recorded, McCorkle faced the problem
of how to locate segments of the verbal behavior which would be
of interest to her for further analysis.

She devised the
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''Catalogue" of data which functioned to condense the material on
the tapes:
The Catalogue of data was constructed to function
as an index to the tapes, primarily for use of the
researchers. Catalogue segments were constructed as
a verbal description of the Interview sessions, reflecting
both the content and process of discussions.
In general, .
two or more relistening sessions were necessary prior to
constructing the Catalogue entry. The tape for a given
session was reviewed and notes taken. The description
of the session was written with an aim of maintaining
as much of the original verbal behavior as convenient.
(p. 194)
The Catalogue, then, was verbal behavior on McCorkle's part,
in response to a taped session, which functioned to (1) condense
the data of taped verbal material,

(2) allow a researcher to

locate particular taped segments without having to listen to an
entire taped session, and (3) provide a reader with some idea of
the nature of the verbal behavior involved in the sessions.

A

sample Catalogue for one participant, which covered the first
eight Interview sessions, is presented in the dissertation.

In

general, the Catalogue system was viewed by McCorkle as a method,
primarily for the benefit of the researcher, to allow her easier
accessibility to material on the tapes.

It should also be noted

that in constructing the Catalogue entries McCorkle was responding
verbally to the verbal material on the tapes, and the entries
themselves provide a sample of her discriminative responses to her
data regarding what were significant aspects of the verbal behavior
in the Interview sessions.
Another way in which McCorkle responded to the material on
the tapes was to construct biographical descriptions of two of the
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participants.

These descriptions, as further verbal behavior on

McCorkle's part in response to the taped material, were constructed
in order to provide a context from which specifics of the women's
verbal behavior could be viewed.

In other words, McCorkle extracted

material from the tapes in which the women discussed their back
grounds and constructed a biographical sketch which she viewed as
important because of its function in helping to make better sense
of the verbal behavior of the women.

In doing so, McCorkle was

interested in (1) providing information which would further shape
relevant discriminations to the verbal behavior she was interested
in, and (2) approximating a verbal description of the women's
"reinforcement histories" in the broad sense of that term.
The problems McCorkle faced in displaying and ordering her
data revolved around the following issue:

given a large sample

(25 hours) of recorded on-going verbal behavior, how do you begin?
In displaying and ordering her data, it appears that McCorkle
responded to several things.

First, McCorkle was interested in

preserving aspects of her data which could be used to help shape
discriminations concerning the issues the women discussed in the
sessions.

She also wished to preserve "the dynamic qualities

of on-going verbal behavior in situ" (p. 244).

Secondly, McCorkle

was interested in the problem of exposing a reader to the kind of
verbal behavior she had generated.

Thirdly, she was interested in

the problem of making the verbal behavior accessible to a researcher.
The next way McCorkle responded to her data had to do with the
identification of certain responses on the part of the participants
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having to do specifically with "women's experience of conflict."

The development of a^ response class
Following her discussion of the Catalogue system, McCorkle
described her efforts to identify segments on the tapes which were
illustrative of "conflict" situations.

In doing so, McCorkle was

attempting to respond discriminatively to segments of verbal
behavior which shared certain properties or had similar effects
on her as a listener.

She was also attempting to expose the

reader to the kinds of verbal behavior in her data which were
descriptive of conflict situations.

She says:

The excerpts presented below represent the researcher's
initial identification of that class of responses
^regarding "conflict situations]. Continued analysis of
the verbal material may further refine the researcher's
discriminations regarding relevant or interesting aspects
of that verbal behavior. For the current purposes,
however, the excerpts can be used to define "conflict"
in a broad sense, or at least to help clarify what we
mean by "conflict." Verbal episodes which seemed to fall
within the class "conflict" included usages of the
following words:
"unbalanced," "confused," "feeling
pulled," "black or white thinking," "...in two places,"
"conflict."
(p. 126)
In her dissertation, McCorkle presented several excerpts
from the tapes, in edited transcript form, in which she discrimina
ted the kind of verbal behavior illustrative of talk about "conflict"
situations.

A sample excerpt is presented below:

Taped segment in which C. describes, in retrospect, a
"conflict" situation regarding her sexual feelings.
C.

I wasn't a fully integrated person.
I
wasn't able to be aware of some of my feelings.
Like, I was confused by sex
I remember
when I was a sophomore...[describes situation]
and I remember it felt so good. One night I
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jumped out of the car and ran up [to the house].
And I remember thinking that's terrible. Terrible!
So I was in two places.
It was so good and it was
terrible...(unintelligible except that C. mentions
"church"). And I guess that was a "conflict"
(pause, laughs).
(Comment: In this excerpt, one can observe Carol's
attempt to specify the environmental conditions surround
ing one experience of "conflict.")
(p. 218)
Some aspects of McCorkle's treatment of defining or developing
the response class of "women's experience of conflict” deserve
further comment.

First, as can be seen in the excerpt above, the

verbal behavior presented was intended to serve as general examples
of the kinds of talk women do when asked to describe "conflict"
situations in their lives.

McCorkle, in developing the response

class, responded to the taped material from her own reinforcement
history.

That is, she attempted to discriminate verbal behavior

which seemed to "describe" the phenomena associated with what we
ordinarily call "conflict situations."

McCorkle had no pre

conceived definition of the components necessary for "conflict" to
exist or the nature of the verbal behavior which may "describe"
conflict situations.

As a radical behaviorist, McCorkle's tech

nique was similar to Skinner's (1945) prescription for operational
definition as described in Chapter I of the present thesis.

That

is, McCorkle regarded "conflict" as a verbal response which is
controlled by a variety of circumstances.

She was interested in

assessing the kinds of verbal stimuli in her data which occasioned
the response "conflict" in her.

The excerpts she presents are

representative of the kinds of verbal stimuli which controlled her
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discriminative responding concerning "conflict."
Secondly, it is also the case that McCorkle was interested in
the phenomena of women's experience which underlie (or contributed
in the control of) the verbal behavior in her data.

The verbal

stimuli in the data which occasioned McCorkle's identification of
"conflict" situations functioned as descriptions of the kinds of
circumstances the women encountered in their lives with respect
to "conflict."

The verbal behavior in these descriptions was

regarded as a source of control over McCorkle's discriminative
behavior with respect to the circumstances which women face and
experience as "conflict" situations.

The problem of convincing a

reader that such verbal behavior is illustrative of "conflict"
situations is handled by relying on the reader's reinforcement
history and discriminative responding with respect to circumstances
under which the reader would agree that "conflict" is described.

Closing Remarks
There is a sense in which "taking Skinner seriously,"
particularly with respect to his treatments of verbal and scienti
fic behavior, produces a significant source of control over the
kinds of research approaches individuals may undertake.

McCorkle's

dissertation shows one example of how an interest in the analysis
of verbal behavior, and a recognition that researcher behavior is
largely shaped by professional and research environments, may
result in some remarkably distinctive approaches to research and
research reporting.

The functional analysis of verbal behavior is
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currently receiving attention from two other individuals at the
University of Nevada, Reno.

Diane Spooner, for her Master's thesis

is undertaking the analysis of one transcript from McCorkle's data.
In her analysis, she is attempting to identify verbal behavior
which functions to clarify the "meanina" of a particular verbal
response.

Spooner is interested in the fact that verbal behavior

which clarifies "meaning" often is descriptive of environmental
factors which appear to be relevant in the control of the behavior
in question.

She is also approaching the problem by assessing how

the verbal stimuli associated with clarifications of "meaning"
function to control and shape her own discriminative behavior in
response to the situation described in the transcript.

Harold Cook

for his doctoral disseration, is interested in responding to
Skinner's interest in the analysis of scientific behavior.

He has

gathered samples of professional verbal behavior which function as
"scientific description" and "scientific explanation."

In his

analysis, he is attempting to identify factors which appear to him
to be controlling the professional verbal behavior in his data.
He, too, is dealing with the assessment of aspects of the verbal
behavior in his data which control his own behavior in identifying
functional relationships relevant to that data.
All of these research endeavors are largely a result of pro
fessional contingencies which resulted in a particular conceptu
alization of researcher behavior.

The kinds of behavior, verbal

and otherwise, which individuals will engage in from such a
radical behaviorist conceptual framework are probably varied.
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However, the major concerns of such individuals at the present time
appear to be (1) the development of procedures which will help shape
discriminative responses in the researcher to verbal behavior and
factors operating in its control, and (2) the clarification of
conceptual issues relevant to these procedures.
A concern with formulating a radical behaviorist epistemology
has naturally led me to examine the relationship between scientific
research activity and certain factors which operate in its control.
The importance of research practices in shaping relevant discrim
inative behavior on the part of the researcher has been examined.
Furthermore, earlier chapters have stressed the importance of
examining scientific verbal behavior.
While Skinner has called for an examination of the contingencies
controlling scientific behavior, it may be clear that we, as
behaviorists, have only begun to explore this important area.
Certain "rules" concerning proper research conduct do exist within
the profession, but the ways in which our professional behavior is
shaped by our research and professional environments have received
little empirical attention.
As we confront certain conceptual issues related to the
production and communication of knowledge in our field, perhaps
more effective verbal and research practices will be developed
and our current practices better understood.

Since so much of

our behavior as scientists appears to be rule-governed, it is
hoped that the development of rules which, in fact, describe
important contingencies operating in the production of useful
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scientific behavior will make subsequent professional behavior more
expedient.

Human behavior, as Skinner has pointed out, is terribly

complex, but it is our task as psychologists to bring about a clearer
understanding and explanation of important aspects of that behavior,
and a place to begin to do this may well be in examining our own
behavior as scientists.
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FOOTNOTES

^Historically, male-gendered words have been commonly used
to refer to both sexes.

However, the use of such language, for

many persons, carries sexist connotations.

While several quota

tions presented in this thesis use male-gendered words to refer
to people in general, the author will present the remaining
quotations without further comment.

2

The following citations in this chapter all refer to

McCorkle, 1978.

Therefore, I will be giving only the page numbers

from that source which refer to the relevant passages.
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